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THE ROAD TO PARIS RUNS THROUGH DELAWARE: CLIMATE
LITIGATION AND DIRECTORS’ DUTIES (FORTHCOMING 2020, UTAH
LAW REVIEW)

Lisa Benjamin*
ABSTRACT
As political and regulatory battles over climate change rage in the United
States, and the Trump Administration unwinds regulation on climate change, the
directors of some of the largest fossil fuel corporations, often referred to as
“carbon-majors,” are facing a barrage of climate litigation claims. This is the
second time directors of these corporations have faced litigation. The first wave of
litigation against carbon majors failed for a number of reasons, including judicial
reluctance to engage with the complex issue of climate change. However, climate
litigation is evolving. In this second wave of litigation, judges have started to
engage more directly with new scientific processes that link specific industry
polluters to global climate impacts. Litigants are also becoming more creative,
attempting to avoid federal displacement arguments encountered in the first wave
by focusing on state-based common law and statutory claims. The number and
scope of claims have also increased, with litigants moving beyond tort-based
claims to employ diverse causes of action, including ones arising under corporate
law. This second wave of litigation will have two implications for corporate law
directors‟ duties. First, the litigation highlights the bidirectional nature of climate
impacts and risks. Corporations contribute emissions to the atmosphere, which
increase the severity of climate-related impacts. Those impacts, in turn, pose
significant risks to corporations themselves. Second, the litigation elevates the risk
profile of climate change from an ethical concern to a significant financial risk
that directors are legally obligated to consider in order to comply with their
directors‟ duties under current corporate law doctrine. This broad but sudden shift
in litigation trends changes the risk equation for directors with respect to climate
change.

*Assistant Professor, Lewis & Clark Law School. This article was written with the
assistance of the Oxford-Princeton Global Leaders Fellowship and Killam Postdoctoral
Fellowship at Dalhousie University, and based on a paper presented at the Climate
Litigation conference held at The University of Aarhus, Denmark and the Vermont Law
School Symposium on Corporations and Climate Change. The author would like to thank
the conference and symposium participants and organizers, as well as Michael Burger,
Meinhard Doelle, Joshua Fershee, George Foster, Joan Heminway, Ben Johnson, Robert
Klonoff, Hari Osofsky, John Parry, Jacqueline Peel, Melissa Powers, Sara Seck and
Michael Vandenbergh for their comments, as well as Jonathan Kiwana for his research
assistance and Tim Nielsen and Kayla Race for their review and edits. Any errors remain
those of the author.
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INTRODUCTION
Climate change has become the defining issue of this generation. Scientific
assessments have become more and more definitive regarding anthropogenic
climate change and the severity of its impacts.1 The window to avoid runaway

1

See LENNY BERNSTEIN ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE
[IPCC], CLIMATE CHANGE 2007 SYNTHESIS REPORT 5 (R.K. Pachauri & A. Reisinger eds.,
2008),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/ar4_syr_full_report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6SCF-4M4B] (―There is very high confidence that the net effect of human
activities since 1750 has been one of warming.‖); INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON
CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], CLIMATE CHANGE 2014 SYNTHESIS REPORT SUMMARY FOR
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climate change is closing quickly.2 In 2015, almost 200 countries made
commitments under the Paris Agreement in relation to climate change. 3
The United States was a largely progressive actor in the Paris Agreement
negotiations.4 The subsequent change in administration has reversed the course of
the United States in relation to climate change, with President Trump submitting a
notice to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement and unwinding

POLICYMAKERS
2,
4,
8
(2014),
https://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar5/syr/AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf [https://perma.cc/AV2R-87QJ] (providing a
report on a number of environmental factors including: atmospheric concentrations of
carbon dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide [being] unprecedented in at least the last
800,000 years;‖ ―[w]arming of the climate system is unequivocal;‖ and ―[c]ontinued
emission of greenhouse gases will cause further warming and long-lasting changes . . .
increasing the likelihood of severe, pervasive and irreversible impacts for people and
ecosystems.‖), [hereinafter IPCC, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014]; Kendra Pierre-Louis, Ocean
Warming Is Accelerating Faster Than Thought, New Research Finds, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/10/climate/ocean-warming-climate-change.html
[https://perma.cc/YW28-DZDW] (―[T]he world‘s oceans are warming far more quickly
than previously thought . . . .‖); Brett Molina, „Dangerous‟ Antarctic Glacier Has a Hole
Roughly Two-Thirds Area of Manhattan, Scientists Warn, USA TODAY (Jan. 31, 2019, 7:38
AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2019/01/31/thwaites-glacier-antarcticamelting-could-impact-sea-levels-nasa/2729840002/
[https://perma.cc/G3R6-3ZAU]
(―Thwaites has been described as one of the world‘s most dangerous glaciers because its
demise could lead to rapid changes in global sea levels.‖); Mario Picazo, Ocean Heat
Waves are Becoming More Severe and Frequent, WEATHER NETWORK (Mar. 12, 2019,
3:14
PM),
https://www.theweathernetwork.com/ca/news/article/ocean-heatwavesbecoming-more-frequent-severe-scientists-say-kelp-krill [https://perma.cc/2UWK-KTC8]
(―Earth‘s atmosphere has been getting warmer over the past century, [and] our oceans have
also shown signs of unprecedented warming . . . .‖).
2
See Myles Allen et al., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC],
Summary for Policymakers, in GLOBAL WARMING OF 1.5°C. AN IPCC SPECIAL REPORT 12
(V.
Masson-Delmotte,
et
al
eds.,
2018),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/sites/2/2019/05/SR15_SPM_version_report_LR.pd
f [https://perma.cc/3B8Q-GK4D] (stating that in order to have a reasonable chance of not
exceeding a 1.5˚C temperature increase, emissions must decrease by ―45% from 2010
levels by 2030‖).
3
See generally U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of The
Paris Agreement, U.N. Doc. FCC/CP/2015/L.9.Rev.1 (Dec. 12, 2015) (agreeing ―to hold
the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2˚C‖).
4
Karl Mathieson & Fiona Harvey, Climate Coalition Breaks Cover in Paris to Push
for Binding and Ambitious Deal, GUARDIAN (Dec. 8, 2015, 3:19 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/08/coalition-paris-push-for-bindingambitious-climate-change-deal [https://perma.cc/5X55-PBHT] (finding the United States
formed part of the ―high ambition coalition‖ which pushed for including the 1.5˚C
aspirational temperature goal).
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domestic regulation and policies on climate change.5 Perhaps due to this regulatory
void, the battle around climate change has shifted to the courts, and this shift has
important implications for directors of fossil fuel-intensive (or carbon-major)
corporations.6

5

See Chris Wold, Climate Change, Presidential Power, and Leadership: “We Can‟t
Wait”, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT‘L L. 303, 304–07 (2012) (noting that even though the
Obama Administration demonstrated some progressive action on climate change, the issue
was not pursued with sufficient urgency and the action that was taken was done primarily
through executive action which is vulnerable to changing administrations); Juliet Eilperin,
Trump Administration Proposes Rule to Relax Carbon Limits on Power Plants, WASH.
POST (Aug. 21, 2018, 8:38 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/healthscience/trump-administration-proposes-rule-to-relax-carbon-limits-on-powerplants/2018/08/21/b46b0a8a-a543-11e8-a656-943eefab5daf_story.html [https://perma.cc/
2N5N-2LZL] (explaining that the current administration has been undoing previous
regulatory progress on climate change); Valerie Volcovici, U.S. Submits Formal Notice of
Withdrawal From Paris Climate Pact, REUTERS (Aug. 4, 2017, 3:25),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-un-climate-usa-paris/u-s-submits-formal-notice-ofwithdrawal-from-paris-climate-pact-idUSKBN1AK2FM [https://perma.cc/P5VD-LD3E]
(reporting on the State Department informing the United Nations that the United States will
withdraw from the Paris Climate Agreement); Edward Wong, Trump Has Called Climate
Change a Chinese Hoax. Beijing Says It Is Anything But., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 18, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/19/world/asia/china-trump-climate-change.html
[https://perma.cc/5PPT-TD7N] (explaining that Donald J. Trump has consistently
questioned the legitimacy of climate science); Emily Holden, ‗It‟ll Change Back‟: Trump
Says Climate Change Not a Hoax, but Denies Lasting Impact, GUARDIAN (Oct. 15, 2018,
1:48 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2018/oct/15/itll-change-back-trumpsays-climate-change-not-a-hoax-but-denies-lasting-impact [https://perma.cc/MSK8-SUKS]
(finding that President Trump is continuing to question climate science and climate
change); David M. Ulhmann, The Trump Administration‟s Orwellian SAFE Vehicles Rule,
AM. CONST. SOC‘Y (Oct. 30, 2018), https://www.acslaw.org/expertforum/the-trumpadministrations-orwellian-safe-vehicles-rule/ [https://perma.cc/LT8A-HJLC] (discussing
―President Trump‘s refusal to acknowledge the dangers of climate change and his
dystopian zeal for undoing Obama-era environmental protection rules‖); Oliver Milman,
‗It‟s a Ghost Page‟: EPA Site‟s Climate Change Section May Be Gone for Good,
GUARDIAN
(Nov.
1,
2018,
3:32
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/nov/01/epa-website-climate-change-trump-administration
[https://perma.cc/7CRK-4P67] (―The EPA under the Trump administration has attempted
to roll back all key measures designed to address climate change . . . .‖).
6
See The Urgenda Climate Case Against The Dutch Government, URGENDA,
https://www.urgenda.nl/en/themas/climate-case [https://perma.cc/4KDW-YM69] (last
visited Oct 8, 2019) (stating that there is a global shift in climate litigation trends with a
number of suits being launched, in particular against Governments by their citizens in
Europe and the United States); Juliana v. United States, 217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233 (D.
Or. 2016), rev‟d and remanded, No.18-36082 (9th Cir. Jan. 17, 2020); Leghari v. Fed‟n of

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379848

THE ROAD TO PARIS

5

Carbon-major corporations have faced a deluge of claims in recent years.
Cities and municipalities from around the United States, including New York
City,7 Oakland and San Francisco,8 San Mateo,9 Marin County,10 City of Imperial
Beach,11 County of Santa Cruz,12 City of Santa Cruz13 and the City of Richmond in
California,14 King County in Washington,15 the State of Rhode Island,16 the City
and Mayor of Baltimore,17 the City and County of Honolulu,18 as well as crab
fishermen in California and Oregon,19 have all initiated claims against carbonmajor corporations. In addition to nuisance-based claims, corporate law fiduciary
duties have also been in play, with an initial decision holding that directors of
ExxonMobil should have disclosed relevant information on climate risk to
shareholders.20 Together these new cases constitute the second wave of corporate
climate litigation.21

Pakistan (2015) W.P. No. 25501/2015 (Pak.) (challenging ―the inaction, delay and lack of
seriousness on the part of the Federal Government and the Government of the Punjab to
address the challenges and to meet the vulnerabilities associated with Climate Change.‖).
7
David Hasemyer, Fossil Fuels on Trial: Where the Major Climate Change Lawsuits
Stand
Today,
INSIDE
CLIMATE
NEWS
(Nov.
8,
2019),
https://insideclimatenews.org/news/04042018/climate-change-fossil-fuel-companylawsuits-timeline-exxon-children-california-cities-attorney-general
[https://perma.cc/8HVS-GH4M] (detailing the ―wave of legal challenges . . . washing over
the oil and gas industry, demanding accountability for climate change, [which] started as a
ripple after revelations that ExxonMobil had long recognized the threat fossil fuels pose to
the world‖).
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
Hasemyer, supra note 7
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
City and County of Honolulu v Sunoco LP, 1CCV-20-0000380.
19
Dana Drugmand, Commercial Fishermen Sue Fossil Fuel Industry for Climate
Impacts,
CLIMATE
LIABILITY
NEWS
(Nov.
15,
2018),
https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2018/11/15/fisheries-crab-climate-change-liability/
[https://perma.cc/G97Q-ZQSY] (―Crabbers in California and Oregon have suffered
significant economic losses and are seeking to hold fossil fuel companies accountable . . .
.‖).
20
Karen Savage, Federal Judge: Employees Can Pursue Climate Fraud Suit Against
Exxon,
CLIMATE
LIABILITY
NEWS
(Aug.
15,
2018),
https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2018/08/15/climate-fraud-suit-exxon-employeesramirez/ [https://perma.cc/T2AL-THE8] (discussing misrepresentations made about

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379848

6

THE ROAD TO PARIS

This second wave of litigation highlights a broader set of risks that face
carbon-major corporations. New scientific processes are able to quantify the
historical proportion of climate impacts and damages for which carbon-major
corporations are responsible.22 As the science progresses, it is likely that new and
better-grounded legal challenges against carbon-majors will escalate. Judges are
overcoming their prior hesitancy and engaging more directly with new scientific
processes and outcomes. Litigants are also attempting to overcome federal
displacement hurdles23 that posed a barrier to successful outcomes in the first wave
of litigation by grounding their claims more closely in state-based common law
and statutory offenses.24 Even if these renewed litigation efforts experience
setbacks or are ultimately unsuccessful, corporations are likely to be the subject of

climate change).
21
See Martin Olszynski et al., From Smokes to Smokestacks: Lessons from Tobacco
for the Future of Climate Change Liability, 30 GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 14–15 (2017);
Geetanjali Ganguly et al., If at First You Don‟t Succeed: Suing Corporations for Climate
Change, 38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 841, 842 (2018) (identifying a second wave of
corporate climate litigation). An earlier ―first wave‖ of climate litigation in the United
States against corporations floundered for two primary reasons. First, courts viewed
climate change as properly within the domain of federal regulation, and held that the
federal Clean Air Act displaced climate change claims brought under federal common law
tort. See generally Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011). Second,
plaintiffs struggled to prove causation and judges were reluctant to engage with climate
science. Id. at 428. At the time, science could not link a specific company‘s emissions to a
specific plaintiff‘s damages. Even if tort was appropriate, then, it was unclear that plaintiffs
could prevail, and so this first wave of climate litigation failed.
22
See Richard Heede, Tracing Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide and Methane Emissions
to Fossil Fuel and Cement Producers, 1854–2010, CLIMATIC CHANGE 229 (2013).
23
In the first wave of climate litigation, judges deferred to federal statutes such as the
Clean Air Act, holding that the Clean Air Act displaces federal common law public
nuisance actions. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424; see also infra Section II.A. In
the second wave, litigants are relying on state-based claims but are facing preemption
hurdles. Federal preemption is contained in the Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution
art. IV § 1. The two cornerstones of preemption are the purpose of Congress and a
presumption against state action where Congress has already legislated. Wyeth v. Levine,
555 U.S. 555, 565 (2009). The common law has established two types of federal
preemption: express preemption, where a federal statute explicitly states that state law is
preempted; and implicit preemption, where there is no explicit preemption. Alan
Untereiner, The Defense of Preemption: A View from the Trenches, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1257,
1259 (2010). Federal statutes can reserve state action and protect it from federal
preemption by the use of savings clauses. The Clean Air Act has such a savings clause
which has been an issue in the second wave of climate litigation. See infra note 134 and
infra Part II E.
24
See infra Section II.E.
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increased regulatory and public scrutiny as a result.25 Public opinion on climate
change is already shifting, with the majority of Americans now ―alarmed‖ or
―concerned‖ about the issue.26 Changing public opinion could shift political
approaches to the issue, and incentivize federal regulatory action as already
evidenced by the introduction of the Green New Deal in Congress,27 and renewed
efforts by Democrats in the U.S. House of Representatives on climate legislation.28
This second wave of litigation has important implications for directors of
carbon-major corporations as it highlights the risks of climate change to
corporations and the financial implications of those risks. The risks of climate
change have become so great that they threaten corporate profits and international
fiscal stability. 29 Directors must consider the financial implications of climate risks

25

See Sophie Marjanac et al., Acts of God, Human Influence and Litigation, 10
NATURE GEOSCIENCE 616, 616 (2017); Ganguly et al., supra note 21, at 842; Olszynski et
al., supra note21, at 21.
26
Abel Gustafson et al., Americans are Increasingly “Alarmed” About Global
Warming, YALE PROGRAM ON CLIMATE CHANGE COMMUNICATION (Feb. 12, 2019),
https://climatecommunication.yale.edu/publications/americans-are-increasingly-alarmedabout-global-warming/ [https://perma.cc/R6H9-VZ2U] (noting that six in ten Americans
are either alarmed or concerned about climate change, with the proportion of Americans
alarmed about climate change doubling from 2013 to 2018); although almost half of
Americans are unwilling to pay for climate policies. See Adam Aton, Most Americans
Want
Climate
Change
Policies,
SCI.
AM.
(Oct.
3,
2017),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/most-americans-want-climate-change-policies/
[https://perma.cc/5MMB-U6PT] (noting that in a 2017 poll 7 out of 10 Americans believed
climate change was happening but half would be unwilling to pay even $1.00 more on their
electricity bills to lower emissions).
27
While light on detail at the moment, the Green New Deal proposal puts forward a
series of actions to address both climate change and economic inequality, by decarbonizing
the electricity grid, transportation systems, and industry. See H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong.
(2019).
28
Ari Natter & Anna Edgerton, Pelosi Says House to Revisit Climate Bill Based on
2009
Bill,
BLOOMBERG
(Jan.
4,
2019,
10:10
AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-04/pelosi-says-house-to-revisitclimate-plan-based-on-2009-bill-jqiapimq [https://perma.cc/BL4J-RU2L].
29
Mark Carney, in his position as the Governor of the Bank of England, highlighted the
potential risks of climate change to both industries and international fiscal stability. He
noted that climate change could negatively affect between four to forty-three trillion dollars
of global assets by the end of the century. See THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, THE
COST OF INACTION: RECOGNIZING THE VALUE AT RISK FROM CLIMATE CHANGE (2015),
https://eiuperspectives.economist.com/sites/default/files/The%20cost%20of%20inaction_0.
pdf [https://perma.cc/6X2E-MYLK]. Carney‘s 2015 speech to insurers in Lloyds of
London stated that the risks of climate change are threefold: physical risks to insured
assets, liability risks from litigation, and transition risks, including financial risks from
changing regulatory requirements to transition to a lower-carbon economy. He also
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in order to comply with their fiduciary duties. Risks to corporations include
transition and physical risks. Transition risks are those risks associated with the
transition to a lower-carbon economy, such as policy or regulatory changes, as well
as litigation, technology, market changes, and reputational risk. 30 Physical risks
affect operational assets and supply chains and are driven by both slow impacts of
climate change, such as a rising sea-level, as well as extreme weather events, such
as droughts, wildfires, storms, and flooding. Risks specific to the energy industry
include water shortages, melting permafrost affecting transportation routes, and
damage to coastal energy infrastructure.31
Despite these risks, directors, officers, and their legal advisors justifiably may
have been, and continue to be, operating under the view that corporate fiduciary
duties either prevent or disincentivize directors from focusing corporate attention
and resources on combatting climate change. In accordance with this view, some
directors will have hesitated or declined to assess and address climate-related
risks.32 This is largely due to corporate law focusing almost exclusively on
shareholders and shareholder profits.33 Directors‘ fiduciary duties are duties
imposed by statute and common law on directors, and owed by directors primarily
to the corporation.34 The shareholder wealth maximization norm is a powerful

highlighted the role of initial law suits against pension fund managers of carbon major
companies in elevating long-term risks of climate change and their implications for
fiduciary duties. His speech at Lloyds of London in 2015 was the precursor to the
establishment of the Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosures by the G-20.
Nina Chestney, G20 Task Force Issues Framework for Climate-Related Financial
Disclosure, REUTERS (Jun 29, 2017, 12:08 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usclimatechange-financial-disclosure/g20-task-force-issues-framework-for-climate-relatedfinancial-disclosure-idUSKBN19K0JW [https://perma.cc/39VU-TXW2].
30
TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES, RECOMMENDATIONS OF
THE T ASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES 5 (2017),
https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/FINAL-TCFD-Report-062817.pdf
[https://perma.cc/R2PY-QGWM].
31
Infra Part IV A. Climate change impacts will be felt across economies, and impacts
will be differentiated across sectors. See Sarah Barker, An Introduction to Directors‟ Duties
in Relation to Stranded Asset Risks, in STRANDED ASSETS AND THE ENVIRONMENT RISKS,
RESILIENCE AND OPPORTUNITY 202 (Routledge 2018). Even within the fossil fuel industry
some sectors have already been affected differently, with bankruptcies seen throughout the
coal industry.
32
See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its
Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 1970), https://nyti.ms/1LSk9ku [https://perma.cc/XZT8TC3G].
33
Id.
34
For example, the Model Business Corporation Act states that all directors shall act in
good faith and in a manner that the director reasonably believes to be in the best interest of
the corporation. MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 8:30(a) (AM. BAR ASS‘N 2010). Likewise,
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norm that has guided the interpretation of directors‘ duties under corporate law for
many decades.35 Like corporate law, it places shareholders, and their perceived
need for profit maximization, at the heart of directors‘ duties.
This Article takes a different perspective and urges a contrary approach.
Corporations will face increased legal responsibility as climate science improves,
climate impacts escalate in frequency and severity, corporations and the public
face increased risks, and public opinion shifts. Corporate fiduciary duties and the
shareholder wealth maximization norm that guides their application compel
directors to identify and assess the risks of climate change to the corporation, and
may even incentivize directors to address these risks, particularly if they take a
long-term management approach. While short-term business perspectives may still
pose barriers to progressive climate action, new research is pointing to a business
case for transitioning away from fossil fuels and towards cleaner energy sources,
even for the largest carbon-major corporations. Businesses are also failing to
address climate-induced risks and damage in the short-term as well. The business
case for climate action, combined with the increased risks of climate change to
corporations, should spur progressive action, even as fiduciary duties are
interpreted under Delaware law (where most carbon-major corporations are
headquartered). A climate-friendly approach should be viewed by directors not
only as a response to risk, but also as part of a strategy to adapt to climate impacts
in the short, medium, and long-term, and ensure profitability for shareholders.
Corporate action, moreover, is essential for dramatic and much-needed
contributions to meeting global climate goals under the Paris Agreement. As
Vandenbergh and Gilligan note, private environmental governance and corporate
actions can achieve major greenhouse gas emission reductions in the face of
government gridlock.36 Corporate law can be an important tool to facilitate

Tennessee law states that directors shall discharge all duties in a manner the director
reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation. TENN. CODE ANN. § 4818-301(a) (2019).
35
See Joan Hemingway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of Statutes,
Decisional Law and Organic Documents, 74 WASH & LEE LAW REV. 939, 950–56 (2017).
36
Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan M. Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, 40 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 217, 220 (2015) (identifying private environmental governance as actions by
private organizations performed without government collaboration, delegation or
outsourcing). In the existing government gridlock, Vandenbergh and Gilligan explain that
while private actions are a second-best option to government action, these activities are
critical and could reduce emissions by roughly 1,000 million tons of CO2 per year between
2016-2025. Id.; see also Michael P. Vandenbergh, THE DRIVERS OF CORPORATE CLIMATE
MITIGATION, in THE ENVIRONMENTAL FORUM 29 (2018); Michael P. Vandenbergh,
PRIVATE ACTORS: PART OF THE PROBLEM, PART OF THE SOLUTION, in ENVIRONMENTAL
FORUM 48 (2017).
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progressive climate action by corporations.37 Identifying corporate law as a bridge
and not a barrier to ambitious corporate climate action, therefore, has broad
relevance. This Article illustrates that the road to meeting the Paris Agreement‘s
climate goals could, in fact, run through Delaware-based corporate law.
This Article is structured as follows. Part I describes why climate change
poses difficulties for corporate law, and why carbon-majors are the focus of
renewed litigation efforts. Part II charts the evolving nature of climate litigation
against these actors, including hurdles encountered in the tort-based first wave of
climate litigation, and how the second wave of litigation is attempting to overcome
these hurdles.38 Part III examines new risks and responsibilities thrown up by this

37

See generally Sarah E. Light, The Law of the Corporation as Environmental Law, 71
STAN. L. REV. 137 (2019) (arguing that corporate law should in fact be understood as a
fundamental part of environmental law).
38
This Article eschews a comprehensive comparative survey of climate litigation
around the globe, as this work has already been undertaken by other scholars. See, e.g.,
David Markell & J.B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A
New Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, 64 FLA. L. REV. 15 (2012); UN ENVIRONMENT
PROGRAMME, T HE STATUS OF CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION: A GLOBAL REVIEW (2017),
http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/files/2017/05/Burger-Gundlach-2017-05-UN-Envt-CCLitigation.pdf [https://perma.cc/BNT5-JPLH]; DENA P. ADLER, COLUMBIA LAW SCHOOL
SABIN CENTER FOR CLIMATE CHANGE LAW, U.S. CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION IN THE
AGE
OF
TRUMP:
YEAR
ONE
(2018),
https://academiccommons.columbia.edu/doi/10.7916/d8-dg03-cm33
[https://perma.cc/E43C-F6R9]; Brian J. Preston, Climate Change Litigation (Part 1), 2011
CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 3 (2011); Brian J. Preston, Climate Change Litigation (Part
2), 2011 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 244 (2011); R. Henry Weaver & Douglas A. Kysar,
Courting Disaster: Climate Change and The Adjudication of Catastrophe, 93 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 295 (2017); Michael C. Blumm & Mary Cristina Wood, “No Ordinary
Lawsuit”: Climate Change, Due Process and The Public Trust Doctrine, 67 AM. U. L.
REV. 1 (2017); JACQUELINE PEEL & HARI M. OSOFSKY, CLIMATE CHANGE LITIGATION:
REGULATORY PATHWAYS TO CLEANER ENERGY (2015). This Article focuses instead on the
potential impacts of this litigation on corporations generally and on the nexus between
climate risk and directors‘ fiduciary duties more specifically, as this is an under researched
area of law in climate litigation scholarship. See generally Joana Setzer & Lisa C. Vanhala,
Climate Change litigation: A Review of Research on Courts and Litigants in Climate
Governance, 10 WILEY INTERDISCIPLINARY REVIEW: CLIMATE CHANGE 580 (2019)
(identifying 130 articles on climate change litigation published between 200 and 2018 in
order to understand and better situate emerging themes of climate change litigation). It is
important to note that corporations themselves are not passive players in this arena and
have been active in litigation efforts, acting as plaintiffs in a number of suits. It is also
important to note that some corporations have been progressive and proactive in the
climate change arena, and so not all carbon-major corporations can be classed as
―laggards.‖ However, this Article focuses on a small subset of cases where carbon major
corporations are defendants in order to assess the implications of these cases for directors‘
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second wave of litigation by providing a synthesis of directors‘ duties under
Delaware law and highlighting how these developments in climate litigation may
(and should) affect corporate behavior in the context of climate risk. It also
examines potential barriers to climate liability. Part IV charts a potential way
forward for directors, highlighting the management tools and strategies that are
available to them.
I. THE CHALLENGE OF CLIMATE CHANGE FOR CORPORATE LAW
Climate change poses significant issues for legal structures and governance.
Climate change is highly polycentric, dynamic, uncertain, and socio-politically
sensitive, and so poses challenges to legal orders which seek certainty and
stability.39 The structure of the law is subdivided into specific levels of governance
and therefore is ineffective in governing a problem such as climate change, which
has impacts on local, regional, and international scales.40 Climate change has been
described as a ―super wicked‖ policy problem, 41 as it poses challenges to legal
orders that are designed to create and maintain legal stability for traditional
governance regimes.42
In addition, climate science is a particularly complex discipline. It involves
elements of risk, probability, and, therefore, uncertainty. There are uncertain
temporal delays between emissions and effects. And since it is impossible to run
controlled experiments, the discipline is heavily dependent upon climate models.43
As Fisher et al. note, ―[t]he dynamic nature of climate change does not sit easily
with legal orders that value stability and legal certainty.‖ 44 These are difficult areas
for judges to wrap their arms around and may explain previous judicial reticence in
engaging with climate change and climate science in particular.
A. The Failure of Corporate Law to Address Climate Change
Climate change challenges legal orders, and this dynamic is further
highlighted within the realm of corporate law and its application to carbon-major
corporations. Corporate law is traditionally designed to focus on shareholders and

fiduciary duties.
39
Elizabeth Fisher et al., The Legally Disruptive Nature of Climate Change, 80 MOD.
L. REV. 173, 174 (2017).
40
Hari M. Osofsky, Is Climate Change “International”? Litigation‟s Diagonal
Regulatory Role, 49 VIRGINIA J. INT‘L L. 586, 591 (2009).
41
Richard Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the
Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153, 1159 (2009).
42
Fisher et al., supra note39, at 176.
43
Id. at 179.
44
Id. at 181.
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profit-making, with non-shareholders being relegated to the realm of
environmental law or some other non-corporate legal arena.45 Environmental
issues, including climate change, are traditionally viewed as beyond the
responsibility and remit of corporate law. Transnational carbon-major corporations
have been largely unregulated in terms of their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions,46
and corporate law has been an underused tool to incentivize emissions reduction.47
Most carbon-major corporations approach emissions reductions as a voluntary and
largely ethical initiative, and part of broader corporate social responsibility aims. 48
Climate change is a particularly intractable problem for these types of corporations

45

Shareholder primacy and contractarian theories have consistently argued that
externalities are more appropriately catered for by welfare laws and environmental or other
regulations outside of the realm of corporate law. They argue that corporate law should
focus solely on shareholders and shareholder wealth maximization. See Friedman, supra
note 32; Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89 COLUM. L.
REV. 1416, 1446–48 (1989); Jonathan R. Macey, An Economic Analysis of the Various
Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary
Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 26–39 (1991); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller,
Corporate Stakeholders: A Contractual Perspective, 43 U. TORONTO L. J. 401, 401–07
(1993); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, 89
GEO. L.J. 439, 440–43 (2000); Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role
of Organizational Law, 110 YALE L. J. 387, 390 (2000); Henry Hansmann & Reinier
Kraakman, What is Corporate Law?, in THE ANATOMY OF CORPORATE LAW 1, 13 (Reinier
Kraakman et al. eds., 2004); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy: The Means and
Ends of Corporate Governance, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 547, 591 (2002) [hereinafter
Bainbridge, Director Primacy]; Stephen M. Bainbridge, In Defense of the Shareholder
Wealth Maximization Norm: A Reply to Professor Green, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1423,
1430–31 (1993) [hereinafter Bainbridge, In Defense]; William W. Bratton, Jr., The New
Economic Theory of the Firm: Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471,
1480 (1989); David Millon, Redefining Corporate Law, 24 IND. L. REV. 223, 223–27
(1991). See generally Lucian A. Bebchuk, Letting Shareholders Set the Rules, 119 HARV.
L. REV. 1784, 1784–86 (2006); Ronald J. Gilson, Separation and the Function of
Corporation Law, 2 BERKELEY BUS. L. J. 141, 144–47 (2005).
46
Lisa Benjamin, The Responsibilities of Carbon Major Companies: Are They (and Is
the Law) Doing Enough?, 5 TRANSNAT‘L ENVTL. L. 353, 353–54 (2016).
47
Id. at 375–76; Lisa Benjamin, The Duty of Due Consideration in the Anthropocene:
Climate Risk and English Directorial Duties, 11 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 90, 93–96
(2017); SARAH BARKER ET AL., DIRECTORS‘ PERSONAL LIABILITY FOR CORPORATE
INACTION
ON
CLIMATE
CHANGE
21
(2015),
https://static1.squarespace.com/static/569da6479cadb6436a8fecc8/t/56e211bb27d4bd91a2
17cd88/1457656252528/Directors_liability_inaction_February_2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/7XEU-G2EB]; Beate Sjafjell, Why Law Matters: Corporate Social
Irresponsibility and the Futility of Voluntary Climate Mitigation, 8 EUR. COMPANY L. 56,
61–64 (2011).
48
Benjamin, supra note46, at 368–70.
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as efforts to reduce or internalize the costs of GHG emissions undermines their
business models.49 GHG emissions are treated as a negative externality by
corporate law, a cost to be pushed outside of the corporation and absorbed by
society.50 Climate change is the ―mother of all externalities‖51 or ―perhaps the
greatest negative meta-externality ever imposed by economic systems on the
natural world,‖52 and one that corporate law has traditionally been unwilling to
address. Corporate law has encouraged the outsourcing of negative externalities
beyond the responsibility of the corporation, as this approach is more profitable.53
Carbon-majors are a major source of GHG emissions, but they have not yet been
held legally responsible for their contributions to climate change.
B. Why Carbon-Majors?
Carbon-majors have become the focus of a new wave of climate litigation.
There are several reasons why they have attracted renewed legal attention. Only a
small number of carbon-major corporations contribute a large amount of GHG
emissions.54 The concentration of these entities into large, transnational groups,
combined with their long history in the industry, make them accountable entities in
terms of the quantity of their historical emissions. They have continued to operate
around the globe largely unregulated in terms of their GHG emissions.55 Lack of
regulatory oversight may be another reason for the recent emergence of litigation
against these entities.56
New scientific processes have clearly identified the monumental
contributions corporate emissions have made to climate change and related
negative impacts.57 These new scientific processes can identify the specific
contributions corporations have made to climate change, making them a clearer

49

Id. at 357–58; Sjafjell, supra note47, 56–58; Jim Krane, Climate Change and Fossil
Fuel: An Examination of Risks for the Energy Industry and Producer States, 4 MRS
ENERGY & SUSTAINABILITY: REV. J. 1, 5–8 (2017).
50
An externality is a cost or benefit which is externalized outside of the corporation. A
negative externality is a cost.
51
Richard S. J. Tol, The Economic Effects of Climate Change, 23 J. ECON.
PERSPECTIVES 29, 29 (2009).
52
Rosetta Lombardo & Giovanni D‘Orio, Corporate and State Social Responsibility:
A Long-Term Perspective, 3 MOD. ECON. 91, 92 (2012).
53
Benjamin, supra note46, at 354–58.
54
Heede, supra note22, at 234.
55
Peter C. Frumhoff et al., The Climate Responsibilities of Industrial Carbon
Producers, 132 CLIMATIC CHANGE 157, 158–62 (2015).
56
Hari M. Osofsky & Jacqueline Peel, Energy Partisanship, 65 EMORY L.J. 695, 717–
18 (2016).
57
See infra Section II.B.
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target for litigation as well as, independent of litigation, regulatory attention. New
scientific studies challenge the prevailing assumption that corporate law should not
consider and address the contributions of corporations to climate change. 58 The
studies demonstrate that corporate actors are the primary cause of historical
emissions and clearly articulate their factual responsibility. These corporations also
have high levels of scientific and technical expertise, and thus were in a position to
understand and act on available climate data. Rather than acting on this new data,
however, many of the corporations in the United States, Canada, Australia, and the
United Kingdom sought to discredit and disparage scientific evidence and lobbied
to prevent policies that encouraged a transition away from fossil fuels.59
In addition, and combined with increased litigation and regulatory risks, the
impacts of climate change are mounting, and directors, as well as investors such as
institutional investors and financiers, are now encouraged to view climate risk in a
bidirectional manner – considering both the contributions of corporations to
climate impacts but also the significant impacts and risks climate change poses to
their businesses. These risks are particularly acute for carbon-major corporations,
and investors are becoming concerned. Carbon-majors‘ deceptive approach to
climate change, combined with their substantial presence in the value chain and
high exposure to climate risk, makes them ―prime litigation targets.‖60 New
scientific studies, combined with the increasing risk of climate change to society
and corporations, have helped to make carbon-majors the focus of climate
litigation.
II. THE EVOLUTION OF CLIMATE LITIGATION

58

Heede, supra note22, at 229–30.
Frumhoff et al., supra note55, at 159–63. The Union of Concerned Scientists also
enumerate the decades-long campaign described in internal corporate documents carried
out by a handful of carbon-major corporations such as Chevron, BP, Shell, Conoco Philips,
ExxonMobil and Peabody Energy to deceive the American public by distorting the realities
and risks of climate change, block policies designed to hasten the transition to clean
energy, and carry out a coordinated campaign to spread climate misinformation in order to
maintain their profitability. See generally KATHY MULVEY & SETH SHULMAN, UNION OF
CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, THE CLIMATE DECEPTION DOSSIERS: INTERNAL FOSSIL FUEL
MEMOS
REVEALED
DECADES
OF
CORPORATE
DISINFORMATION (2015), https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/07/TheClimate-Deception-Dossiers.pdf [https://perma.cc/TYH3-HB2L] (providing a summary of
seven ―deception dossiers‖ of internal company and trade association documents that have
been leaked to the public as part of a coordinated campaign to allegedly spread climate
misinformation and block climate action).
60
Sonja van Renssen, Courts Take on Climate Change, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE
655, 656 (2016).
59
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The first wave of climate litigation against carbon-major corporations faced
a number of hurdles.61 These included problems in proving causation under tort
law, how to identify an appropriate class of defendants and issues of standing,62 the

61

This first wave of litigation focuses on a select group of cases where carbon-major
corporations stood as defendants, but it should be noted that there have been a number of
pro- and anti- regulation suits in the United States as well. For example, in Massachusetts
v. Envtl. Prot. Agency (EPA), 549 U.S. 497 (2007), the U.S. Supreme Court explicitly
accepted climate science and ushered in a regulatory mandate for the EPA to regulate GHG
emissions under the Clean Air Act. See Melissa Powers, Country Report: USA Climate
Change in the Supreme Court, 2012 IUCN ACADEMY ENVTL. L. J. 245, 246 (2012) (noting
that the outcome of American Electric Power Co. v. Connecticut, 564 U.S. 410 (2011),
could have been influenced by the changing regulatory context of climate change under the
Obama Administration).
62
While this Article does not deal with issues of standing in depth, standing issues did
occur in the first wave of litigation. The U.S. Supreme Court has interpreted Article III of
the U.S. Constitution as requiring that, in order to have standing to bring a case in federal
court, the plaintiff must establish: (i) the plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact; (ii) that
injury is fairly traceable to the defendant‘s misconduct; and (iii) the injury is capable of
being redressed by the court. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 517 (2007); Lujan v.
Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992). The Murphy Oil case is a notable example
of both issues of standing and causality in the context of suits against carbon major
corporations, though the case is ultimately unhelpful due to a number of procedural
oddities that took place. See Comer v. Murphy Oil USA, 585 F.3d 858 (5th Cir. 2009). The
plaintiffs in Murphy Oil sued a number of corporations, including insurance corporations,
carbon major corporations, and banks, for damages wrought by Hurricane Katrina. The
plaintiffs targeted carbon major corporations due to their contributions to climate change,
which the plaintiffs claimed led to the unprecedented strength of the storm. The plaintiffs
pointed to the knowledge of carbon major corporations about climate change and their lack
of action to use technology or their profits to combat it. Id. at 864–65. While the district
court dismissed the case for various reasons, including lack of standing, an appellate panel
in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had standing
to bring claims of public and private nuisance, trespass and negligence, which all depended
on a causal link between emissions and destruction of their property. Id. at 879–80. The
Fifth Circuit panel relied on Massachusetts v. EPA, which acknowledged a plausible link
between man-made emissions and global warning. Id. at 865–866 (citing Massachusetts v.
EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007)). On top of this standing conclusion, the panel‘s causation
analysis is also notable in that the court accepted, at the pleadings stage at least, a fairly
traceable connection between the alleged injury in fact and the alleged conduct of the
defendant for standing purposes. Murphy Oil, 585 F.3d at 879–80. According to the panel,
traceability in this context did not require the demonstration of scientific certainty that the
corporations‘ emissions caused the precise harm suffered by the plaintiffs. Instead, the
court recognized that injuries could be fairly traceable to actions that contributed to, rather
than solely or materially caused, greenhouse gas emissions and global warming. Id. at 864–
66.
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political question doctrine,63 as well as the difficulty in linking harm to a particular
person or entity caused by specific emissions from one state or one company.64
Causation requires that plaintiffs demonstrate a causal connection between the
harm suffered and the actions of the defendant. Causation remains factually
difficult, if not impossible, to prove due to the disparate nature of GHG emissions,
and so remains a challenge for litigation against corporations, even in the second
wave of litigation. Emissions of GHGs from different sources mix in the
atmosphere and have impacts all over the globe. As a result, this process of mixing
makes attributing a particular harm to a particular emitter difficult, if not
impossible. This creates significant hurdles for plaintiffs in tort-based actions,
although new scientific processes are closing the causation gap. This section will
focus on judicial reluctance to take on the complexity of climate science, and
judicial preference to defer the issue to legislative bodies based on, among other
issues, federal displacement arguments in the first wave of climate litigation. These
difficulties have, in the past, created insurmountable barriers for tort-based
litigation suits against corporations. This section will demonstrate how litigants are
attempting to dismantle these two hurdles in the second wave of climate litigation.
A. Hurdles in the First Wave of Climate Litigation
The first wave of cases against carbon-majors failed primarily due to the
federal displacement doctrine – that federal legislation such as the Clean Air Act
displaces federal common law. A number of courts in the United States preferred
to defer the issue, instead, to legislative bodies. Judges were also reluctant and/or
poorly equipped to deal with the complexities of climate science.
Two major cases in the first wave of litigation were American Electric
Power Co. v. Connecticut (AEP)65 and Native Village of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil

These initial wins for the Murphy Oil plaintiffs were short-lived, however. The
panel‘s decision in Murphy Oil was vacated when the Fifth Circuit agreed to an en banc
review. Although the court agreed to hear the en banc panel, it was unable to form a
quorum and thus dismissed the case, and the panel‘s decision remained vacated. Comer v.
Murphy Oil, 607 F.3d 1049, 1053–55 (5th Cir. 2010).
63
The political question doctrine states that courts will only adjudicate matters of law
and will refrain from adjudicating matters which are determined to be political questions
which are best left to the legislature, as stipulated in the Supreme Court‘s decision in
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803). See, e.g., City of Oakland v. B.P., 325 F. Supp. 3d
1017, 1028 (N.D. Cal. 2018), appeal pending, No. 18-16663 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 5, 2020).
64
See Preston, (Part 1), supra note38, at 7; Josephine van Zeben, Establishing a
Governmental Duty of Care for Climate Change Mitigation: Will Urgenda Turn the Tide?,
4 TRANSNAT‘L ENVTL. L. 339, 348 (2015).
65
564 U.S. 410.
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Corp. (Kivalina).66 These cases illustrate judicial inadequacies when dealing with
climate science, as well as a judicial reluctant to adjudicate such a systemic issue
as climate change. Some of these hurdles are being challenged in the second wave
of climate litigation.
AEP was a public nuisance suit brought by eight states and New York City
against six electric and utility corporations. The plaintiffs argued that the emissions
of these corporations interfered with public rights and asked the court to impose
declining emission caps on these entities in order to reduce emissions.67 The
Supreme Court rejected the claim, holding that the Clean Air Act ―displaced‖ any
federal nuisance action dealing with climate change.68 Justice Ginsburg, writing for
a unanimous Court, wrote that there was no ―parallel track‖ for federal nuisance
claims on climate change.69 This definitive statement by the Supreme Court
effectively closed the door to future federal nuisance common law claims on
climate change,70 even though the EPA had not taken comprehensive action on
climate change at the time.71
AEP also illustrates the judicial reluctance, or ―skittishness,‖72 of the courts
in dealing with climate change disputes and climate science. Burkett notes the
regressive approach of the Court in acknowledging climate science, as the Court in
AEP cited a skeptical magazine article in the same context as multiple peerreviewed articles, going on to make a ―facile indictment‖ 73 of all living, breathing

66

696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 418–19.
68
Id. at 423; see also, James Flynn, Climate of Confusion: Climate Change Litigation
in the Wake of American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 29 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 823, 846
(2013); Fredric Eisenstate, American Electric Power Company v. Connecticut: How One
Less Legal Theory Available in the Effort to Curb Emissions Is Actually One Step Forward
for the Cause, 25 TUL. ENVTL. L. J. 221, 222 (2012); Phillip Divisek, Climate Change
Torts: American Electric Power v. Connecticut, 7 MACQUARIE J. INT‘L & COMP. ENVTL. L.
108, 108 (2011).
69
Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 425.
70
Flynn, supra note68, at 856; Divisek, supra note68, at 109.
71
The Court in AEP held that plaintiffs‘ nuisance claims were displaced by the Clean
Air Act regardless of whether the ―EPA actually exercises its regulatory authority,‖ and
―[t]he critical point is that Congress delegated to EPA the decision whether and how to
regulate carbon-dioxide emissions . . . the delegation is what displaces federal common
law.‖ Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 425–26. But see Flynn, supra note68, at 847–48
(arguing that the Clean Air Act only addresses domestic air resources whereas the impacts
of climate change are more complex, exceeding impacts on air, and are also
transboundary). This may point to a general reluctance by the judiciary to tackle what they
considered to be a political issue.
72
Maxine Burkett, Climate Justice and the Elusive Climate Tort, 121 YALE L. J.
ONLINE 115, 118 (2011).
73
Id. This approach lies in stark contrast to Massachusetts v. EPA, where the Supreme
67
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individuals as contributing to climate change. The reluctance of the judiciary to
appropriately cater for climate science, in this case, stands in contrast to newer
judicial attitudes to climate science illustrated in the second wave of climate
litigation. The AEP case also revealed the concerns of the judiciary over acting as
arbiters of scientific debates.74 The enormity of the issue of climate change and its
implications for industrial development may also have been decisive factors for
courts in the first wave of climate litigation. Courts have been reluctant to make
definitive findings of fact about climate change and are sensitive to climate change
policy being the purview of legislative bodies.75
In Kivalina, the Alaskan Native Village of Kivalina brought a suit for public
nuisance against twenty-two fossil-fuel producers.76 The Village claimed that these
corporations contributed to climate change, which led to the dramatic reduction of
the Arctic sea ice that had previously sheltered their homes from winter storms.77
In September 2012, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court‘s dismissal of their
claim, concluding that common law tort claims had been ―displaced‖ by federal
legislation.78 The decision did not address the district court‘s refusal to determine
what acceptable levels of emissions by the corporate defendants should be and who
should bear the costs of those emissions.79 The Kivalina decision suggests that

Court easily accepted climate science. 549 U.S. at 521–22.
74
Osofsky & Peel, supra note56, at 766.
75
For example, the Court in AEP asserted that courts ―lack the scientific, economic,
and technological resources [of] an agency . . . ‖ to regulate climate change. Am. Elec.
Power Co. 564 U.S. at 428. As another example, in People v. General Motors Corp.,
California lost its suit against major automobile manufacturers for impacts from climate
change partly due to the court determining it was not able to impose damages without
unreasonably encroaching onto global issues. No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 WL 2726871, at
*16 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 17, 2007); see Ganguly et. al., supra note21, at 12; Weaver & Kysar
supra note38, at 325 (stating that courts were overwhelmed by the sheer complexity and
size of the climate change problem); James Huffman, Previously Unrecognized Rights:
Climate Change Lawsuits and the Rule of Law, QUILLETTE (Oct. 30, 2018),
https://quillette.com/2018/10/30/previously-unrecognized-rights-climate-change-lawsuitsand-the-rule-of-law/ [https://perma.cc/8A69-GCN2].
76
Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9th Cir. 2012).
77
Id. at 855; see Flynn, supra note68, at 836; Peter Manus, Kivalina at the Supreme
Court: A Lost Opportunity for Federal Common Law, 8 PITT. J. ENVTL. & PUB. HEALTH L.
223, 225 (2014).
78
Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 858. In May 2013, the Supreme Court denied the plaintiffs‘
petition for certiorari without comment, leaving the Ninth Circuit decision intact. Native
Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849 (9 th Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 569 U.S.
1000 (2013); see Karine Péloffy, Kivalina v ExxonMobil: A Comparative Case
Commentary, 9 MCGILL INT‘L J. SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. POL‘Y 119, 122 (2013).
79
Kivalina, 696 F.3d at 854 (affirming the district court‘s holding that these ―were
matters more appropriately left for determination by the executive or legislative branch‖).
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AEP will continue to apply to all federal U.S. climate change tort claims,
regardless of the specified remedy.80 Powers notes that AEP effectively foreclosed
the use of federal tort law to mitigate climate change. 81 Both AEP and Kivalina laid
bare the judicial preference in U.S. courts to ensure that climate change is decided
by the legislature.82 This judicial preference persists in the second wave of climate
litigation and, as a result of these cases, federal common law nuisance claims on
climate change against corporations still face tremendous hurdles. Litigants in the
second wave of climate litigation have attempted to dismantle these hurdles, with
varying levels of success. Litigants have started to draft their claims in order to
avoid the federal displacement doctrine.83 They have also been assisted by new

80

Quin M. Sorenson, Native Village of Kivalina v. Exxonmobil Corporation: The End
of “Climate Change” Tort Litigation?, 44 ABA TRENDS 1, 6 (2013).
81
Powers, supra note61, at 245.
82
Flynn, supra note68, at 837.
83
For example, a class action suit was launched by young people in the U.S. District
Court for the District Court of Oregon, claiming that the actions of the federal government
that caused climate change, as well as the government‘s inaction to prevent it, had violated
the plaintiffs‘ Fifth Amendment Due Process rights by denying protection provided to
previous generations, by favoring economic short-term interests and denying future
generations of essential natural resources, including a safe climate. Juliana v. United States,
217 F. Supp. 3d 1224, 1233–34 (D. Or. 2016), rev‟d and remanded, No.18-36082 (9th Cir.
Jan. 17, 2020). At the time of writing, the case was proceeding to a request for a 9th Circuit
en banc review, but industry intervenors withdrew, partly due, according to Blumm and
Wood, to concerns about having to respond to disclosure requests. Despite their withdrawal
being granted, Blumm and Wood argue that exposure of the relationship between
government and the fossil fuel industry will prove to be one of the more devastating
outcomes of the case. Blumm & Wood, supra note38, at 28, 55 (citing Order at 5, Juliana,
217 F. Supp. 3d at 1224 (No. 6:15-cv-01517-TC)). Blumm and Wood also note Juliana‘s
use of the public trust doctrine (PTD), which would be exempted from the federal
displacement doctrine, which only applies to federal common law claims, whereas the
District Court recognized the PTD as an ―inherent limit on sovereignty and implicit in the
Constitution‘s due process clause.‖ Id. at 51–52 (citing Juliana, 217 F. Supp. 3d at 1261).
If successful, the regulatory implications of this case would be vast and, as a result, it has
been called the ―trial of the century.‖ See Peter Singer, The Trial of the Century, Fighting
for a Healthier Planet, THE DAILY STAR (Sept. 15, 2018, 12:09 AM),
https://www.dailystar.com.lb/ArticlePrint.aspx?id=463429&mode=print
[https://perma.cc/DFG3-QSH8]. The procedural elements of the case are extremely
complex. As part of these proceedings, Chief Justice Roberts granted a temporary halt in
response to a request by the federal government to stay the case. In re United States, 139 S.
Ct. 16, vacated, 139 S. Ct. 452 (2018); see also Michael Blumm & Mary Wood, These
Kids and Young Adults Want Their Day in Court on Climate Change, THE CONVERSATION
(Oct. 26, 2018, 6:44 AM), http://theconversation.com/these-kids-and-young-adults-wanttheir-day-in-court-on-climate-change-105277 [https://perma.cc/8VV3-6PZP]. However, the
stay was subsequently lifted. In re United States, 139 S. Ct. 452, 453 (2018). An oral
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scientific processes and developments which have clearly attributed the majority of
historical GHG emissions to carbon-major corporations, and judges have started to
engage more confidently with this new climate science.
B. New Scientific Processes
Recent developments in scientific processes have identified the contributions
of carbon-majors to climate change and provided an impetus to renewed climate
litigation efforts. In 2013, Richard Heede published a groundbreaking quantitative
analysis of historic fossil fuel and cement production records of 90 leading
investor-owned, state-owned, and nation-state producers of oil, natural gas, coal,
and cement. His study concluded that these 90 carbon-major entities were
responsible for 63% of cumulative worldwide industrial emissions of carbon
dioxide and methane from 1854-2010.84 Investor-owned entities contributed the
majority of these emissions, 315 gigatonnes, followed closely by nation-states, and
state-owned fossil fuel and cement-producing entities.85 The twenty largest
investor- and state-owned energy corporations were responsible for 29.5% of all
global industrial emissions, and the ten largest investor-owned corporations alone
were responsible for 15.8% of global industrial emissions through 2010.86
Heede‘s analysis has been revolutionary in terms of its ability to attribute a
percentage of global emissions to these entities. Heede‘s work has been a
motivating factor in the second wave of litigation around the world against these
entities, and it has been referred to in almost every new suit launched against
carbon-major corporations.87 Heede‘s research demonstrates the gap between
scientific attribution and legal assignment of responsibility. The law has so far

hearing was held in front of the Ninth Circuit on June 4, 2019. See Oliver A. Houck, The
Children‟s Climate Case: Our Obligation to Future Generations, THE HILL (Nov. 6, 2018),
https://thehill.com/opinion/energy-environment/415307-the-childrens-climate-case-ourobligation-to-future-generations [https://perma.cc/YR9D-8RCS]. The 9th Circuit in
January ruled 2-1 to dismiss the lawsuit. While the court accepted climate science and that
urgent action was needed, it dismissed the suit on the basis of lack of standing based on the
inability of the Court to provide redress. Judge Josephine Staton‘s dissent in the case,
however, is notable. Class action suits by young people were also launched in 2018 in:
Canada, ENvironnement JEUnesse v. Procureur Général du Canada, [2018] No. 500-06;
Florida, First Amended Complaint, Reynolds v. Florida, No. 18-CA-000819 (Dec. 26,
2018); Washington, Aji P. v. Washington, No. 18-2-04448-1-SEA (Wash. Super. Ct. Aug.
14, 2018); and Alaska in 2017, Sinnok v. Alaska, No. 3AN-17-09910 (Alaska Super. Ct.
Oct. 30, 2018).
84
Heede, supra note22, at 234.
85
Id.
86
Id.
87
See, e.g., Hasemyer, supra note 7.
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fallen behind scientific progress in the context of corporate climate emissions and,
therefore, corporate accountability. Whether or not Heede‘s factual accountability
can be translated into legal accountability is unclear, particularly within tort law.
Heede‘s carbon-major study has been further developed by probabilistic
event attribution science, often called attribution science. 88 This discipline is
developing quickly and is able to attribute the multiplying contribution of climate
change to particular extreme events, although attribution science is more confident
in certain areas than others.89 Event attribution relies on observational records to
determine changes in probability or magnitude of climate-related events and uses
model simulations to compare the manifestation of an event in a world with
human-caused climate change and a world without.90 It does this by constructing
factual and counterfactual probabilities or worlds. A factual probability is one
where an event occurs in the currently observed world as it exists in the context of
climate change, and a counterfactual probability occurs in a hypothetical ―control‖
world without human influence on the climate.91 By comparing the real-world

88

See GABRIELE C. HEGERL ET AL., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE
CHANGE [IPCC], GOOD PRACTICE GUIDANCE PAPER ON DETECTION AND ATTRIBUTION
RELATED TO ANTHROPOGENIC CLIMATE CHANGE 2–7 (Thomas Stocker et al. eds., 2009),
http://www.ipccwg2.awi.de/guidancepaper/IPCC_D%26A_GoodPracticeGuidancePaper.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DMS3-XGB7] (reviewing the effect climate change is having on the earth
via attribution theory and providing for methodology, different approaches, and data usage
of the attribution based analysis); see also NATHANIEL L. BINDOFF ET AL.,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE [IPCC], DETECTION AND ATTRIBUTION
OF CLIMATE CHANGE FROM GLOBAL TO REGIONAL (Judit Bartholy et al. eds., 2018),
https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WG1AR5_Chapter10_FINAL.pdf
[https://perma.cc/G5PU-PC5E] (discussing the detection and attribution evaluation
methodologies and the effect attribution has on climate change). The National Academies
Press recently published a report on the state of attribution science, stating that scientific
understanding of climate and weather mechanisms is improving, and as a result rapid
progress is being made in event attribution. NAT‘L ACAD. OF SCI., ENG‘G, & MED.,
ATTRIBUTION OF EXTREME WEATHER EVENTS IN THE CONTEXT OF CLIMATE CHANGE 1, 6–
7 (National Academies Press, 2016).
89
Confidence in attribution studies is strongest where there exist long historical
records of observations which can be simulated adequately by climate models. These tend
to be purely meteorological events which are not strongly influenced by issues such as
infrastructure and population trends, or in circumstances where other factors can be
carefully and reliably considered. The findings are strongest for extreme events related to
aspects of temperature, such as extreme heat or cold events and heavy rainfall, and tend to
be less robust for tropical cyclones, wildfires and drought. See NAT‘L ACAD. OF SCI.
ENG‘G, & MED., supra note87, at 1–13.
90
Id. at 2–3.
91
Id. at x (noting the first attribution study was published in 2004 regarding the European
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events to the hypothetical ones, climate scientists can predict which events were
caused, at least in part, by climate change.
This new process of attribution science has been applied to corporate actors as
well and has the potential to impact legal tests such as causation. Therefore,
attribution science is likely to inspire future litigation efforts against these actors.
Fossil fuel corporations are becoming an increasing focal point of attribution
efforts, building on the initial work by Heede, in relation to specific temperature
increases and sea-levels. Heede‘s work has been expanded by Ekwurzel et al., who
recently published a paper tracing the contributions of emissions by several
carbon-major corporations to the rise in global mean surface temperatures. Their
paper determined that the combustion of products from 90 carbon-major entities
from 1880-2010 led to 0.4°C increase in global mean surface temperatures,
constituting 50% of the total global increase during this time period.92 Combustion
from 1980–2010 led to a 0.28°C rise, constituting 35.1% of total global mean
surface temperature increase during that period. 93 Their models are scalable and
allow for the testing of the relative contributions of these entities, even at
individual levels for the largest emitters (Chevron, ExxonMobil, Saudi Aramco,
and Gazprom).94 They are also able to trace increments of sea-level rise to the
combustion of fossil fuel products from these entities, which has direct relevance
to the recent cases launched in the second wave of climate litigation where
government entities are claiming abatement costs for sea-level rise.95
These new studies make great headway in closing the causation gap
highlighted in the first wave of climate litigation. Developments in attribution

heatwave in 2003, and estimated that the summer was 0.5°C warmer); see also Peter A.
Stott et al., Human contribution to the European heatwave of 2003, 432 NATURE 610, 610–
14 (2004). Event attribution science has progressed tremendously since that date, with
Daniel Mitchell et al.‘s study being able to now attribute a certain number of deaths during
the heatwave to human induced climate change. See Daniel Mitchell et al., Attributing
human mortality during extreme heat waves to anthropogenic climate change, 11 ENVTL.
RESEARCH LETTERS 1 (2016).
92
B. Ekwurzel et al., The Rise in Global Atmospheric CO2 Surface Temperature, and
Sea Level from Emissions Traced to Major Carbon Producers, 144 CLIMATIC CHANGE
579, 585 (2017).
93
Id.
94
Id. at 582, 586–88 (noting three sources of uncertainty: equilibrium climate
sensitivity; the short-term effects of fossil fuel aerosols; and the policy relevance of
different time periods of historical emissions).
95
Id. at 586–88 (clarifying that their work is not designed to assign responsibility, an
issue which they reserve for societal judgment). They do acknowledge that the tools of
attribution science are being applied to characterize specific damages resulting from
specific players in anthropogenic climate change, and therefore societal judgments should
be informed by the ongoing scientific analysis.
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science have the potential to ―change the legal landscape,‖96 leading to
implications for directors with legal duties to consider and avoid foreseeable harm.
Improvements in attribution science are proving foreseeability, which is key to
establishing a tort-based duty of care.97 These studies make the connection
between corporate emissions and their harm very clear. Evidence from attribution
science will catalyze future climate change litigation, and may inform common
law-based litigation of directors‘ and officers‘ liability. 98 Indeed, despite the lack
of federal legislative progress on climate change in the United States, a second
wave of climate litigation against carbon-major companies has already begun in
earnest, as the next Section discusses. While cases in the first wave were
unsuccessful, cases in the second wave are using multiple legal tools and
attempting to scale the hurdles encountered in the first wave of litigation. In
addition, judges in these cases are demonstrating more willingness to acknowledge
and manage climate science.
C. The Second Wave of Climate Litigation: Hurdling the Hurdles
A number of new suits were launched primarily by government actors in
2017 and 2018 in the United States and around the world. In this second wave,
climate litigation is taking a variety of forms, including using tort law, public and
private nuisance, human rights, and the public trust doctrine.99 Newer cases against
corporations have also employed fiduciary duty and security law disclosure
requirements or statutory offenses,100 highlighting a turn to corporate law in the
second wave of litigation. Litigants in the second wave are also attempting to

96

Marjanac et al., supra note25, at 616.
Id.
98
Id. (noting that probabilistic evidence is already accepted in U.K. occupational
exposure to toxic substances cases where causation has been proved when the evidence
demonstrates a ‗doubling-of-the-risk‘ test, that the risk was increased by a factor of 2:1);
see e.g., XYZ v. Schering [2002] EWHC 1420 (UK); Sienkiewicz v. Greif [2011] UKSC
10 (UK).
99
Preston, (Part 1), supra note 38, at 4; Preston, (Part 2), supra note38, at 258;
Blumm &Wood, supra note38, at 73–83.
100
For example, New York‘s Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW §§ 352–353
(McKinney 2019) has been relied up on by the Attorney General of New York to
investigate and sue ExxonMobil. See Decision and Order at 2, People of the State of New
York v. ExxonMobil Corporation, No. 451962 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 26, 2016). The Martin
Act is a New York anti-fraud law which provides the Attorney General with expansive
powers of investigation into securities fraud. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352–353. In
December 2019 the court ruled against New York on its Martin Act claim against Exxon
see John Schwartz, New York Loses Climate Change Fraud Case Against Exxon Mobil,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 10, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2sdIAYF.
97
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overcome the federal displacement hurdle by citing state-based claims and
breaches of other state legislation.101
Tort-based claims are evolving, and attribution science may be influencing
both their initiation and outcomes.102 For example, in 2017, a case in Germany,
RWE v Lliuya,103 found that a causal and proximate relationship exists between the
emissions of a German energy company, RWE, and climate damage experienced
in Peru.104 The plaintiff cited Heede‘s calculations that RWE was responsible for
0.47% of all historic emissions, and therefore asked for 0.47% of the total costs of
remediation actions taken in Peru.105 On appeal, the Appellate Hamm Court agreed
with the plaintiffs, provisionally accepting arguments that it was sufficient that
RWE was partially responsible for the flood risk.106 The case was able to
overcome, at least in principle, one of the most intractable legal hurdles to date in

101

See supra notes 9–17.
Weaver & Kysar, supra note38, at 339 (arguing that courts should be re-examining
the parameters of tort law considering the catastrophic impacts of climate change).
103
Stefan Küper, Higher Regional Court Hamm: Large Emitters Can Be Held Liable
for
Climate
Change
Impacts,
GERMANWATCH,
(Nov.
13,
2017),
https://germanwatch.org/en/14702 [https://perma.cc/V5YE-29FM].
104
Mr. Lliuya‘s house sits downhill of a glacial lake, Lake Palcococha. The volume of
the lake has increased eight-fold in the past forty years, with glacial melt directly
contributing to its increased volume. His home is vulnerable to glacial outbursts—
inundations of the natural moraine dams surrounding the lake that would lead to flood
waves, possibly reaching over 3 meters. He based his claim on paragraph 1004 of the
Germany Civil Code, which deals with interference with property. See Landgericht [LG]
[Essen Regional Court] Dec. 12, 2016, Lliuya v. RWE AG, 5 (Ger.).
105
See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [District Court of Essen] Dec. 15, 2016, Case No.
20285/15. Abatement costs requested were minimal, amounting to approximately €17,000
(approximately USD$19,000). The first decision in the District Court of Essen dismissed
the claim for the usual tort-based causation hurdles. The District Court stated that the lack
of precision made the claim inadmissible, and RWE‘s contribution to climate change was
not sufficient to establish legal causality, citing the lack of linear causality between a
particular source and particularized damage. Similar to AEP, Am. Elec. Power Co. v.
Connecticut 564 U.S. 410, at 12 (2011), the court also mentioned that every living person
is an emitter, and referred to the chain of causation as ―scientifically disputed.‖
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [District Court of Essen] Dec. 15, 2016, Case No. 20285/15 at 6.
106
Lliuya v. RWE AG, CLIMATE CASE CHART (last Accessed on Mar. 28, 2020),
http://climatecasechart.com/non-us-case/lliuya-v-rwe-ag/ [https://perma.cc/W8TF-7DHZ].
RWE appealed the decision in December 2017, and that appeal was denied in February
2018. The case will now move on to the evidentiary phase, and the court has requested
expert evidence in two areas: that the flood/mudslide resulting from expansion of water
posed serious threats to Mr. Lliuya‘s property, and whether RWE‘s emissions rose into the
atmosphere and according to the laws of physics led to higher concentrations of GHGs in
the Earth‘s atmosphere.
102

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379848

THE ROAD TO PARIS

25

terms of tort-based actions against corporations: causation. The civil law
jurisdiction of Germany is far removed from common law jurisdictions, such as the
United States, and the case may remain an outlier for some time. Despite this, the
outcome of the RWE case demonstrates that some jurisdictions are willing to base
their decisions on new scientific processes and illustrates how the evolution of
climate science could affect future U.S. lawsuits.
D. Managing Climate Science
In 2017 and 2018, government entities launched suits against a number of
carbon-major corporations. While most of these cases are still at their procedural
or initial substantive stages, issues of causation and federal versus state jurisdiction
have already been implicated. This second wave of cases can be divided into two
groups, the first brought by the cities of New York,107 Oakland, and San
Francisco,108 which have made a more limited set of claims and where initial
substantive decisions have already been made. The second group of claims has
been brought by a number of cities and counties in California, as well as other
government entities around the United States,109 based on a broader set of claims
but where no substantive decisions have yet been made.
In the first group of cases, New York City claimed, in federal court, that the
City had incurred, and would continue to incur, substantial costs due to climate
change, and that the largest five fossil fuel companies should be responsible for
these costs as they were responsible for approximately 11% of carbon and methane
pollution and had downplayed the risks of climate change.110 New York‘s claim
was sited upon both public and private nuisance law, as well as illegal trespass due
to sea-level rise. In July 2018, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of
New York granted a motion to dismiss filed by the defendant companies on the

107

See generally City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466 (S.D.N.Y.
2018) (detailing litigation action from the City of New York against the collective
defendants for the general affects they have had on the environment), appeal pending, No.
18-2188 (2d Cir. argued Nov. 22, 2019).
108
City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1019 (N.D. Cal. 2018)
(dismissing Oaklands and San Francisco‘s public nuisance action), appeal pending, No. 1816663 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 5, 2020).
109
Complaint at 75–94, City of Imperial Beach v. Chevron Corp., C17-01227 (Cal.
Super. Ct. July 17, 2017), Doc. 1; Complaint at 95–118, City of Santa Cruz v. Chevron
Corp., 18-cv-0458 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2017), Doc 1; Complaint at 90–111, City of
Richmond v. Chevron Corp., C 18-00055 (Cal. Super. Ct. Jan. 22, 2018), Doc. 1;
Complaint at 78–97, Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 17-CIV-03222 (Cal. Super. Ct.
July 17, 2017) Doc. 1; Complaint at 79–98, Cty. of Marin v. Chevron Corp., CIV-17-02586
(Cal. Super. Ct. July 17, 2017), Doc 1; see also infra Section II C.
110
City of New York v. BP, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 471.
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basis that federal common law governed the City‘s claims, as they were based on
transnational emissions, and their claims were displaced by the Clean Air Act and
presented nonjusticiable political questions.111 The case demonstrates how difficult
a hurdle the federal displacement issue is to overcome.
In the Oakland and San Francisco cases, the plaintiffs filed suit in state court
against the same five carbon-major corporations, seeking abatement, not damages,
for the costs to them of adapting to sea-level rise induced by climate change on the
basis of public nuisance.112 One of the more interesting aspects of the case was
that, after the cases were consolidated and removed by the defendants to federal
court, the judge ordered a tutorial on climate change that took place in March
2018. Judge Alsup requested specific information on the history of the scientific
study on climate change, as well as on the best science now available on global
warming, glacial melt, sea rise, and coastal flooding.113 The request for a scientific
tutorial in a federal lawsuit was called ―unprecedented.‖114 This innovative
approach to climate science may usher in a new approach in U.S. cases of judicial
assessment and acknowledgment of climate science, including attribution science.
The case demonstrated a more sophisticated judicial approach to climate science
than was demonstrated in the first wave of climate litigation.
Judge Alsup‘s understanding of climate science is reflected in the judgment,
which clearly stated that the case was not about climate science but about the law,
―whether these producers of fossil fuels should pay for anticipated harm that will
eventually flow from a rise in sea level.‖115 Ultimately, his answer was no, and the
court dismissed the claim in June 2018, based on a number of grounds, including
the federal displacement doctrine, and that the issue was largely a political one.116

111

Id. at 471–72. An appeal is currently pending in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit, and oral arguments were held in November 2019. City of New York v. BP
P.L.C., No. 18-2188 (2d Cir. argued Nov. 22, 2019).
112
City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1021, 1024 (N.D. Cal. 2018),
appeal pending, No. 18-16663 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 5, 2020).
113
Id.; see also California v. BP P.L.C., No. C-17-06011 WHA and No. C-17-06012
WHA (Feb. 27, 2018) (Notice Re Tutorial). Both Chevron‘s lead attorney and Myles Allen
for the plaintiff (and co-author of the original attribution study in 2004), presented to the
judge. Chevron‘s attorney stated that the company acknowledged that humans are playing a
major role in climate change, but instead his presentation focused on the scientific
uncertainty in the IPCC AR5 reports, particularly around sea-level rise. The roles of
population growth and economic development were also stressed. See Warren Cornwall, In
a San Francisco Courtroom, Climate Science Gets its Day on the Docket, SCI. MAG. (Mar.
22, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2018/03/san-francisco-court-roomclimate-science-gets-its-day-docket [https://perma.cc/9ZL7-473U].
114
Cornwall, supra note113.
115
City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1022.
116
Id. at 1024.
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The court also applied the Restatement (Second) of Torts‘ definition of public
nuisance: an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public.117 Whether the interference was unreasonable under the Restatement‘s test
depended in part on weighing the harm of the conduct against the utility of the
conduct. Judge Alsup found that it was necessary to consider the social value of
fossil fuels, which outweighed the harm of the conduct.118 The Oakland judgment
illustrates that, in this second wave of climate litigation against corporations,
judges are able and willing to assess complex climate science. But the case also
illustrates that both the federal displacement doctrine, combined with judicial
reluctance to adjudicate corporate climate harms, is alive and well in U.S.
jurisprudence against carbon-major corporations and will remain a stumbling block
in federal common law claims.119
In both the New York City and the Oakland and San Francisco cases, the
courts rejected the plaintiffs‘ attempts to invoke state common law to avoid the
federal displacement doctrine. In City of New York, the court noted that the ―City
has not sued under New York law,‖ and its claims were properly analyzed as
federal common law claims and were therefore displaced by the Clean Air Act.120
In contrast, the plaintiffs in Oakland expressly brought their original claims under
California public nuisance law and in state court, but the defendants nevertheless
successfully removed the case to federal court and convinced the federal judge that
federal common law governed the claims.121 In denying the plaintiffs‘ motion to
remand the case to the state level,122 Judge Alsup commented that if ever a
problem ―cried out for a uniform and comprehensive solution‖ at the federal level,
it is climate change.123 The lack of success in the attempts by Oakland, San
Francisco, and New York to invoke state law was a fatal flaw for the initial
substantive decisions in this first group of cases and has been taken into account by
litigants the second group of cases. Most of the claims in the second group
specifically ground their actions in a wider set of claims, including state-based
common law and statutes.124

117

Id. at 1024 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (AM. LAW INST.,
1979)).
118
Id. at 1023.
119
The case has been appealed to the Ninth Circuit. City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., No.
18-16663 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 5, 2020).
120
City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2018), appeal
pending, No. 18-2188 (2d Cir. argued Nov. 22, 2019).
121
City of Oakland, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1021.
122
Id.
123
Order Denying Motion to Remand at 4, ¶ 26, California v. BP P.L.C., No. C 1706011 WHA and No. C 17-06012 WHA (N.D. Cal. Feb. 27, 2018).
124
See Complaint at 75–94, City of Imperial Beach v. Chevron Corp., No. C17-01227
(Cal. Super. Ct. Jul. 17, 2017), Doc. 1; Complaint at 99–122, Cty. of Santa Cruz v.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379848

28

THE ROAD TO PARIS

E. Avoiding Federal Displacement
The second group of cases brought by California cities and counties attempts
to avoid the federal displacement doctrine by making a more diverse set of claims
grounded in state law, including public and private nuisance, strict liability for
failure to warn customers of the dangers of climate change, design defect,
negligence, and trespass.125 These suits were patterned more closely on tobacco
and asbestos litigation.126 In both the tobacco and asbestos litigation, products that

Chevron Corp., No. 17-cv-03242 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 20, 2017), Doc. 1; First Amend.
Complaint at 89–94, King Cty. v. BP P.L.C., No. 2:18-cv-00758-RSL (W.D. Wash. Aug.
17, 2018), Doc. 113; Complaint at 115–139, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., No. PC-20184716 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 2, 2018); Complaint at 107–129, Mayor of Baltimore v. BP
P.L.C., No. 24-C-18-004219 (Md. Cir. Ct. July 20, 2018).
125
See supra note124. New York City had also framed their claim as being based on the
sales and production of fossil fuels, rather than emissions, but the court rejected this. See
City of New York v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 471–72 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (holding
that New York‘s climate nuisance claims were displaced, reasoning that ―regardless of the
manner in which the City frames its claims . . . the City is seeking damages for globalwarming related injuries resulting from greenhouse gas emissions, and not only the
production of Defendants‘ fossil fuels‖). The original complaint in Rhode Island v.
Chevron Corp. cites the percentage of total emissions that the defendants as a group are
responsible for from the years 1965 to 2015 and, while the plaintiffs acknowledge no linear
causation is possible, the claim states that attribution to each defendant of a quantifiable
amount of carbon emissions is possible, therefore allowing attribution of ambient air and
ocean temperatures, as well as sea-level rise, in response to those emissions on an
individual and aggregate basis. Complaint at 4, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., No. PC2018-4716 (R.I. Super. Ct. July 2, 2018). This is the first time specific attribution science
for specified temperature increases and sea-level rise has been cited in a case against a
carbon major entity in the United States. However, unlike in City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C.,
the judge in Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp. has not requested a ―climate tutorial.‖ Rhode
Island v. Chevron Corp., 393 F. Supp. 3d 142 (D. R.I. 2019) (Order Granting Motion to
Remand).
126
See generally Olszynski et al., supra note 21 (tracking the similarities between
tobacco and climate litigation and noting that tobacco norms that evolved over time closely
tied to evolving scientific understandings of tobacco‘s impacts on human health).
Olszynski et al. describe the ―scorched earth‖ approach that tobacco companies initially
adopted in responding to personal injury litigation. The initial tobacco suits by plaintiffs all
failed, in part due to tobacco‘s vigorous litigation strategies which denied the impact of
smoking on human health. However, as the link between smoking and lung cancer evolved,
so did corporate strategies, shifting to personal responsibility defenses. Olszynski et al.
look a decade into the future, characterized by mounting climate damages and in that
context highlight the similarities between tobacco litigation and climate litigation against
carbon major corporations. Id. at 10-21; see also Ganguly et al. supra note21, at 17 (noting
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were later understood to create severe health and environmental risks, and where
product manufacturers both knew and attempted to disguise the risks of their
products, attracted liability. In the tobacco litigation, tobacco company defendants
adopted a ―scorched earth‖127 litigation strategy, vigorously defending all of the
suits against them. Even though the original tobacco litigation suits were
unsuccessful, the litigation inspired legislative changes and eventually led to
successful litigation.128 Analogies can also be drawn with litigation recently
launched by cities, counties, and states‘ attorneys general against manufacturers
and distributors of opioids.129 A key distinction between all of these other litigation
efforts and climate litigation is the widespread use and reliance on fossil fuels for
global development, and this issue was key to Judge Alsup‘s decision in the
Oakland and San Francisco dismissal.130

that United States v. Philip Morris USA, Inc., 449 F. Supp. 2d 1 (D.D.C. 2006)
demonstrated that governments could recover health and environmental related costs).
Similarities with asbestos litigation can also be noted. Pursuant to Fairchild v. Glenhaven
Funeral Ltd. [2002] UKHL 22, a leading U.K. torts case, a plaintiff who contracted
asbestos while working for different employers was able to recover from one defendant on
the basis of joint and several liability, because the defendant had materially increased the
risk of harm, even though the plaintiff was unable to pinpoint which employer had directly
caused the harm. See also David A. Grossman, Warming up to a Not-So-Radical Idea:
Tort-Based Climate Change Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 22–31 (2003); Michael
Gerrard, What Litigation of a Climate Nuisance Suit Might Look Like, 12 SUSTAINABLE
DEV. L. & POL‘Y 11, 12–14, 56 (2012).
127
Olszynski et al., supra note21, at 10.
128
Gerrard, supra note128, at 18; Olszynski supra note21, at 12–14; Douglas Kysar,
Fossil Fuel Industry‟s „Tobacco Moment‟ Has Arrived, YALE L. SCH. (July 28 2017),
https://law.yale.edu/fossil-fuel-industrys-tobacco-moment-has-arrived
[https://perma.cc/C4A5-55DR].
129
Nicole Fisher, Opioid Lawsuits On Par To Become Largest Civil Litigation
Agreement
in
U.S.
History,
FORBES
(Oct.
18,
2018,
6:52
PM),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/nicolefisher/2018/10/18/opioid-lawsuits-on-par-to-becomelargest-civil-litigation-agreement-in-u-s-history/ [https://perma.cc/RV5D-4FEF]; Joanna
Walters, Sackler Family Members Face Mass Litigation and Criminal Investigations Over
Opioid Crisis, GUARDIAN, (Nov. 19, 2018, 12:01 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/usnews/2018/nov/19/sackler-family-members-face-mass-litigation-criminal-investigationsover-opioids-crisis [https://perma.cc/UR2P-WPVW] (noting the Sackler family which own
Purdue Pharma, one of the manufacturers of OxyContin, is facing class action litigation);
Cassandra Bassler, Suffolk County Sues Purdue Pharma Family Over Opioids, NPR NEWS
(Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.wshu.org/post/suffolk-county-sues-purdue-pharma-familyover-opioids#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/U8U7-AZBV].
130
City of Oakland v. BP P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 1017, 1022 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (―The
scope of plaintiffs‘ theory is breathtaking. It would reach the sale of fossil fuels anywhere
in the world, including all past and otherwise lawful sales, where the seller knew that the
combustion of fossil fuels contributed to the phenomenon of global warming.‖), appeal
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Despite these numerous hurdles, some Californian cities and counties have
been procedurally successful at having their claims heard at the state and not the
federal level. For example, Judge Chhabria in the U.S. District Court for the
Northern District of California agreed to remand County of San Mateo v. Chevron
Corp., to the state level.131 In his order, Judge Chhabria noted that AEP did not
resolve the issue of whether state law claims were preempted by federal statutes
such as the Clean Air Act.132 In his view, once federal common law is displaced by
a federal statute, it is no longer possible that state law claims could be superseded
by federal common law. In other words, federal law does not preclude the
plaintiffs from asserting state law claims. Further, according to Judge Chhabria,
federal law does not govern the plaintiffs‘ claim, and therefore this case could
avoid the federal displacement doctrine.133 The decision cites only a few instances
where federal law will preclude state law, and only narrow circumstances justify
removing a state law case to federal court.134
The County of San Mateo opinion provides important insights into how other
claims made against carbon-major corporations in the second group of cases, and
also future cases, may be decided. In 2018, U.S. states and cities filed several new
suits that have not yet resulted in orders or judgments. In April 2018, the Board of
County Commissioners of Boulder County, Colorado, along with the City of
Boulder, initiated several claims against carbon-major companies for public and
private nuisance, trespass, deceptive trade practices, and violations of the Colorado
Consumer Protection Act.135 In May 2018, King County in Washington State filed

pending, No. 18-16663 (9th Cir. argued Feb. 5, 2020).
131
Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 938 (N.D. Cal 2018),
appeal filed sub nom. Cty. of Marin v. Chevron Corp., No. 18-15503 (9th Cir. Mar. 27,
2018).
132
Cty. of San Mateo, 294 F. Supp. 3d at 937.
133
Id.
134
The opinion cites instances of ―complete pre-emption‖ by a specified federal
statute. Id. It also cites the Grable jurisdiction as requiring the defendants to cite specific
instances of federal law. Id. at 938. The opinion also notes that the savings clause in the
Clean Air Act ―preserve[s] state causes of action and suggest[s] that Congress did not
intend federal causes of action . . . ‗to be exclusive.‘‖ Id. at 938 (emphasis added); see also
42 U.S.C. §7604(e) (2018) (Clean Air Act Savings Clause). The Clean Water Act contains
a similar savings clause. See 33 U.S.C. §§1365(e), 1370 (2018).
135
Board of Cty. Commissioners of Boulder Cty. v. Suncor Energy, Inc., No. 18-cv01672-WJM-SKC, 2019 WL 4200398 (D. Colo. Sept. 5, 2019), appeal filed (10th Cir.
Sept. 9, 2019). This case was filed in Colorado state court in April 2018, but was removed
by the defendants to federal court in June 2018. Notice of Removal, Board of Cty.
Commissioenrs of Boulder Cty. v. Suncor Energy, Inc., No. 1:18-cv-01672-MEH, 2019
WL 4200398 (D. Colo. June 6, 2019). In September 2019, the U.S. District Court for the
District of Colorado granted the Plaintiff‘s motion to remand to state court. For a full
history of this case, see Board of County Commissioners of Boulder County v. Suncor
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a suit against the five largest fossil fuel corporations for coastal harms, flooding,
storm surge and decreased mountain snowpack.136 In July 2018, the State of Rhode
Island and the Mayor and City of Baltimore filed similar suits against fossil fuel
companies citing public and private nuisance, strict liability for failure to warn and
design defect, negligence design defect, and breaches of the Rhode Island State
Environmental Rights Act137 and Maryland Consumer Protection Act.138 Litigants
in this second group are clearly responding to the failure of the first wave and
crafting their pleadings more directly to invoke state law.
In all of these cases, the corporate defendants submitted motions (with
varying degrees of success) to remove the cases to federal court on the grounds
that they involved a significant question of federal common law and federal energy
law policies.139 Federal preemption of state law claims is likely to be a significant
issue in all of these cases and, therefore, a number of these cases may stand or fall
together. In October 2018, King County was granted its request for a stay in
proceedings until the Ninth Circuit appeal of the San Francisco and Oakland case
was decided.140 In March 2020, the appeal by carbon-majors to remove the
Baltimore suit to federal court was denied by the appellate court for the Fourth
Circuit. The Court affirmed the District Court‘s remand order that the suit remain
in state court. Courts in some of the recent climate cases have agreed that state
common law claims are not preempted, because the Savings Clause in the Clean
Air Act‘s Citizen Suit section ―preserve[s] state causes of action and suggest[s]
that Congress did not intend federal causes of action…to be exclusive.‖ 141

Energy (U.S.A.), Inc., SABIN CTR., http://climatecasechart.com/case/board-of-countycommissioners-of-boulder-county-v-suncor-energy-usa-inc/
[https://perma.cc/VT9MFCYH] (last visited Nov. 10, 2019).
136
First Amend. Complaint at 1, King Cty. V. BP P.L.C., No. 2:18-cv-00758-RSL
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 17, 2018) Doc. 113.
137
Complaint at 115–139, Rhode Island v. Chevron Corp., No. PC-2018-4716 (R.I.
Super. Ct. July 2, 2018).
138
Complaint, Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., No. 24-C-18-004219 (Md. Cir. Ct.
July 20, 2018). In addition, in November 2018 a group of crab fishermen in California sued
30 oil and gas companies for damage to their livelihoods due to global warming induced
algae blooms which have shortened the crab season. See Complaint at 1, Pacific Coast
Fed‘n of Fishermen‘s Ass‘ns, Inc. v. Chevron Corp., No. CGC-18-571285 (Cal. Super. Ct.
Nov. 14, 2018).
139
See, e.g., Notice of Removal at 2–4, Mayor of Baltimore v. BP P.L.C., No.
1:18CV02357 (D. Md. June 31, 2018); Order Granting to Remand, Rhode Island v.
Chevron Corp., No. 1:18-cv-00395-WES-LDA (D.R.I. June 22, 2019), Doc. 122
(successfully moving to remand the cases to state court).
140
See Order Granting Partially Unopposed Motion to Stay Proceedings at 2–3, King
Cty. v. BP P.L.C., No. 2:18-cv-00758 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 17, 2018), Doc. 138.
141
Cty. of San Mateo v. Chevron Corp., 294 F. Supp. 3d 934, 938 (N.D. Cal 2018)
(emphasis added); see also Memorandum Opinion at 26–27, Mayor of Baltimore v. BP
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While these cases are at the appellate and preliminary stages, respectively,
they do provide evidence of a growing trend of corporate climate litigation in the
United States—the increasing reliance on climate attribution science and statebased claims. Moreover, the Third Circuit case of Bell v. Cheswick Generating
Station demonstrates that federal preemption under the Clean Air Act may not be a
bar to state-based claims.142 This case could be applied to GHG emissions,
allowing state common law-based claims regarding intrastate emissions, but it
would likely not apply to interstate emissions.143 If this analysis is correct, then the
federal preemption hurdle will have been removed. However, the Bell case also
creates difficulties. Even if they are successful in avoiding federal preemption,
state-based claims are unlikely to be successful given the international and
interstate nature of GHG emissions.144

P.L.C., No. 1:18-CV-02357-ELH (D. Md. June 20, 2019), Doc. 182.
142
734 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 572 U.S. 1149 (2014). In Bell, a
community surrounding a Pennsylvania power-generating station complained that fly ash
and unburned coal settled on their property, causing a considerable nuisance. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit held that the Clean Air Act did not preempt the
plaintiffs‘ case. The case pointed specifically to the savings clause of the Clean Air Act,
which preserves causes of action despite the comprehensive scope of the Act, allows states
to adopt or enforce more progressive standards for emissions, and specifically also allows
citizen suits. Id. at 197 (discussing 42 U.S.C. §7604(e) (2012)). For an analysis of Bell, see
generally, Samantha Caravello, Bell v. Cheswick Generating Station, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 465 (2014) (analyzing the Third Circuit‘s Decision and arguing that the decision
served important functions).
143
Bell followed a case revolving around the savings clause under the Clean Water
Act, (the savings clause under the Clean Water Act is largely similar to that of the Clean
Air Act), International Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 494 (1987). Ouellette states
that while the Clean Water Act‘s savings clause allows states to impose higher standards on
water sources within their borders, and individuals are not preempted from bringing claims
under state law, it only applies to sources of pollution within that state and not to pollution
sources within a different state.
144
For example, the district courts in the New York and Oakland cases rejected
Plaintiffs‘ attempts to avoid dismissal by arguing that emissions are occurring globally and
are thus not entirely addressed by the Clean Air Act. The courts explained that even if the
Clean Air Act did not displace claims alleging harm from international emissions, such
claims would still be barred by the presumption against extraterritoriality, which counsels
against ―unwarranted judicial interference‖ when a claim ―reaches conduct within the
territory of another sovereign.‖ See City of Oakland v. BP, 325 F. Supp. 3d at 1025
(quoting Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 569 U.S. 108, 117 (2013)); see also City of
New York v. BP, P.L.C., 325 F. Supp. 3d 466, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) (―[T]o the extent that
the City seeks to hold Defendants liable for damages stemming from foreign greenhouse
gas emissions, the City‘s claims are barred by the presumption against extraterritoriality . . .
.‖), appeal pending, No. 18-2188 (2d Cir. argued Nov. 22, 2019).
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In order for these new common law tort suits to be successful on the
argument around interstate emissions, courts and plaintiffs will likely need to take
a more innovative approach to tort law. State tort law can fill the gap in the
statutory regime by providing a compensatory remedy to individuals, which the
Clean Air Act does not.145 This is illustrated by a new development in the second
wave of corporate climate litigation— one industry suing another industry over
climate impacts. In 2018, the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen‘s Association
submitted a claim based on public state-based nuisance, negligence, strict liability,
and failure to warn against a number of carbon-major corporations for damage
caused to their industry from the impacts of climate change.146 A number of
academics are skeptical of the utility of tort law in climate litigation,147 and Kysar
has suggested that climate change, due to its diffuse and disparate nature and
effects, constitutes a ―paradigmatic antitort.‖148 However, the legally disruptive
nature of climate change could mean that tort law will evolve to take into account
climate change.149 Developments in climate science show the contributions of
companies to climate impacts and may be sufficient to overcome causation
hurdles.150
Even if these cases are not successful, climate litigation could serve as a
series of ―prods and pleas,‖151 effectively calling attention to the inadequacies of

145

Caravello, supra note142, at 475.
Complaint at 76–89, Pacific Coast Fed‘n of Fishermen‘s Ass‘ns, Inc. v. Chevron
Corp., No. CGC-18-571285 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2018). See the full history of this
case at Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen‟s Associations, Inc. v. Chevron Corp.,
SABIN
CTR., http://climatecasechart.com/case/pacific-coast-federation-of-fishermensassociations-inc-v-chevron-corp/ [https://perma.cc/TC5R-VAKG] (last visited Nov. 10,
2018).
147
See generally, Eric Biber, Climate Change and Backlash, 17 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
1295 (2009) (arguing that climate change policy is made more difficult to craft due to the
delayed effects of climate change); Laurence H. Tribe et al., Too Hot for Courts to Handle
Fuel Temperature, Global Warming and the Political Question Doctrine (Wash. Legal
Found. Critical Legal Issues Working Paper Series No. 169, 2010), https://s3.us-east2.amazonaws.com/washlegaluploads/upload/legalstudies/workingpaper/012910Tribe_WP.pdf [https://perma.cc/24BJHGTF] (detailing a number of issues of climate change litigation focused around two major
problems stemming from concerns about temperature and its chemical and climactic
effects).
148
Donald Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 3–4
(2011).
149
Fisher et al., supra note39, at 190.
150
See supra Section II.B.
151
See generally, Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limiting
Government in an Era of Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350 (2011) (evaluating three
potential obstacles to merits adjudication in the context of how federal and state tort law
146
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existing legal approaches to climate change. Kysar notes that even if climate
litigation efforts fail, the use of tort law can contribute to a larger ecosystem of
governance institutions, and judicial engagement helps frame litigants‘ suffering
and calls public attention to the issue.152 The effects of climate change are certainly
being felt in the cities and states bringing the suits, with large financial
consequences for government entities, which are having to pay for adaptation
actions, even if the emissions are being made elsewhere.153 The international
nature of emissions did not hinder the Court in the RWE case in Germany, 154 and
that case could eventually influence U.S. courts as well.
International judicial decisions are referring to and relying on each other,
and consequentially inspiring further climate litigation in other jurisdictions.
Indeed, the plaintiffs in RWE referred to the Dutch Urgenda case, itself an example
of ―progressive legal reasoning and development‖ and ―ambitious evolution of
doctrine,‖155 particularly in the area of causation.156 The 2015 Urgenda case neatly
glided over the causation hurdles of past cases by stating that a sufficient causal
link can be presumed to exist between Dutch emissions and global climate change,
even though Dutch emissions constitute a small fraction of global emissions. 157 In
October 2018, the Hague Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that failure of the
Dutch government to reduce its emissions to 25% below 1990 levels by 2030
would constitute a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights. 158 The

interacts with climate change).
152
Douglas A. Kysar, The Public Life of Private Law: Tort Law as a Risk Regulation
Mechanism, 9 EUR. J. RISK REG. 48, 50 (2018).
153
See Complaint at 3–6, Pacific Coast Fed‘n of Fishermen‘s Ass‘ns, Inc. v. Chevron
Corp., No. CGC-18-571285 (Cal. Super. Ct. Nov. 14, 2018) (describing the deprivation of
substantive portions of revenue for crab fisheries as well as wholesalers and processers
during the 2015–2018 seasons, as well as indirect losses such as loss of commercial fishing
lifestyles, identity, and loss of public confidence in the safety and quality of crab products)
154
5. Zivilsenat des Oberlandesgericht Hamm [OLG] [Fifth Division for Civil Matters
of the Higher Regional Court of Hamm] Nov. 30, 2017 (Ger.)
155
Fisher, et al., supra note39, at 191.
156
See The Urgenda Climate Case Against the Dutch Government, URGENDA,
https://www.urgenda.nl/en/themas/climate-case [https://perma.cc/6FS5-LCFX] (last visited
Sept. 29, 2019). The Urgenda case was brought by a Dutch nongovernmental organization
(NGO) claiming that the Dutch state should, by 2030, reduce its GHG emissions by at least
25% below 1990 levels, which would achieve the proportion of emissions agreed in an EU
burden-sharing emissions agreement. The NGO was successful, and the government
appealed. The English translation of the case is forthcoming.
157
Rechtbank den Haag 24 juni 2015, m.nt. (Urgenda Foundation/The State of the
Netherlands) (unofficial English translation) (Neth.).
158
Hof den Haag 09 oktober 2018, m.nt. (Urgenda Foundation/The State of the
Netherlands) (upheld bythe Supreme Court of the Netherlands in December 2019, No.
HAZA C/09/456689) (Neth.).
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original decision in 2015 had already inspired similar litigation in the European
Union and beyond,159 and the appellate decision is likely to lead to progressive
regulatory change within the EU.
The interaction between these judgments discussed above points to a global
conversation carried on by courts on the issue of causation, whether through torts,
constitutional human rights, or private law mechanisms. Whether the RWE case‘s
approach to partial causation will be relied upon in the United States or cases in
other jurisdictions against carbon-major corporations remains to be seen.
Nonetheless, it seems likely that, as European courts and courts in other countries
hold carbon majors accountable, U.S. localities, nongovernmental organizations
(NGOs), and individuals will continue to pursue claims in U.S. courts. Further,
multinational corporations such as carbon-majors are sensitive to progressive
decisions in other jurisdictions due to the global reach of their operations.160
Litigation risk will persist for carbon-majors, even if the second wave of litigation
is unsuccessful.
Beyond litigation risk, regulatory proposals are emerging. In September
2018, U.S. Senator Elizabeth Warren proposed the Climate Risk Disclosure Act,
which would require disclosure to the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) of a corporation‘s total fossil fuel-related assets, how those assets would be
affected by climate change, and how directors are managing climate risks to those
assets.161 In January 2019, Rep. Deutch Theodore reintroduced the Energy

159

For example, in 2019, NGOs in The Netherlands sued Shell on behalf of 30,000
people in 70 countries to legally compel them to reduce emissions. See FRIENDS OF THE
EARTH INTERNATIONAL, Netherlands: Activists sue Shell over Climate Change, BUSINESS
& HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE (Apr. 8, 2019), https://www.businesshumanrights.org/en/netherlands-activists-sue-shell-over-climate-change
[https://perma.cc/KZL2-WRZ9] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019). The Urgenda case has also
inspired litigation around the world on similar grounds in: the United Kingdom, Plan B and
Others v. Secretary of State for Transport (2019) EWHC 1070; France, Notre Affaire à
Tous and Others v. France (letter of formal notice filed Dec. 17, 2018), and Commune de
Grande-Synthe v. France (filed January 2019)); Ireland, Friends of the Irish Environment
CLG v. The Gov‘t. of Ireland (decided Sept. 19, 2019); and Switzerland, Union of Swiss
Senior Women for Climate Protection v. Swiss Federal Council and Others, No. A2992/2017.
160
Lisa Benjamin, The responsibilities of corporations: new directions in
environmental litigation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON TRANSNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW (Veerle Heyveart and Leslie-Anne Duvic-Paoli eds. forthcoming, 2020).
161
See Climate Risk Disclosure Act of 2019, S. 2075, 116th Cong. (2019); see also
Karen Savage, New Bill Would Require the SEC to Police Companies‟ Climate Risks,
CLIMATE
LIABILITY
NEWS
(Sept.
20,
2018),
https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2018/09/20/climate-risks-disclosure-sec-elizabethwarren/ [https://perma.cc/WQD5-YSD2]. The recent experience with European privacy
laws and data protection is also illustrative. The EU General Data Protection Regulation
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Innovation and Carbon Dividend Act to price carbon, provide revenue to
households, and reduce domestic greenhouse gas emissions 90 percent by 2050.162
In addition, the Green New Deal has attracted significant public attention. While
the resolution in its current form is broad, it proposes a set of economic stimulus
programs designed to address both climate change and economic inequality. 163 It
aims for net-zero emissions through decarbonizing the electricity grid,
transportation systems, and industry.164 The Democratic Party is also considering
making climate change a fundamental platform in the 2020 federal election in
order to appeal to younger voters.165 These regulatory approaches would certainly
provide a more comprehensive and systemic approach to climate change than
courts can provide, but may be slower to emerge in the United States than in other
jurisdictions.166 Even if this second wave of climate litigation faces setbacks or

has introduced sweeping changes in the management of personal data, along with
significant fines. Justin Jaffe & Laura Hautala, What the GDPR means for Facebook, the
EU and you, CNET.COM (May 25, 2018), https://www.cnet.com/how-to/what-gdpr-meansfor-facebook-google-the-eu-us-and-you/
[https://perma.cc/3YES-QRDR].
Large
technology companies such as Google and Facebook have chosen to comply with the
regulations across all of their corporate entities.
162
H.R. Res. 763, 116th Cong. (2019); see also Steve Valk, Climate Action:
Bipartisan Energy Innovation and Carbon Dividend Bill Reintroduced in Congress, RED
GREEN & BLUE (Jan. 24, 2019), http://redgreenandblue.org/2019/01/24/climate-actionbipartisan-energy-innovation-carbon-dividend-bill-reintroduced-congress
[https://perma.cc/L62C-FGK7].
163
H.R. Res. 109, 116th Cong. (2019) (―Recognizing the duty of the federal government to
create a green new deal‖); Lisa Friedman, What is the Green New Deal, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/21/climate/green-new-deal-questionsanswers.html [https://perma.cc/G74T-8EUN].
164
Id.
165
Coral Davenport & Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Pressed by Climate Activists, Senate
Democrats Plan to „Go on Offense‟, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/04/us/politics/senate-democrats-climate-change.html
[https://perma.cc/6QHF-9F24].
166
A comprehensive treatment of state and federal action on climate change is beyond the
scope of this article, but it is clear that, despite existing federal hurdles on climate
regulation, regulatory action is occurring at the state and local levels. For example,
Colorado updated its Climate Action Plan in 2018, incorporating a 2017 Executive Order‘s
goal to reduce GHG emissions by 26% by 2025. See H.B. 1261 (codified at COLO REV.
STAT. §25-7-102 (2019) (updating original 2007 version); see also Colorado Climate Plan
2018 Update- State Level Policies and Strategies to Mitigate and Adapt, ADAPTATION
CLEARINGHOUSE (July 2018),
https://www.adaptationclearinghouse.org/resources/colorado-climate-plan-2018-updatestate-level-policies-and-strategies-to-mitigate-and-adapt.html [https://perma.cc/M5AXFWM8] (explaining the update to Colorado‘s 2007 Climate Plan). In addition, North
Carolina plans to cut GHG emissions by 40% by 2025. Governor of N.C. Exec. Order No.
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missteps, its effects, combined with the changing balance of the risks of climate
change to corporations, will still be felt within corporate law.
III. NEW RISKS AND RESPONSIBILITIES FOR CORPORATE ACTORS
The impacts of climate change are increasing, and, with them, the risks to
corporations are rising. Climate impacts and risks entail financial costs for
corporations, but climate change also provides opportunities to corporations
through a transition to clean energy. Private law can make substantive
contributions to climate change and the global energy transition away from fossil
fuels. Corporate directors‘ duties are purposefully open-textured and able to
advance and change depending on evolving industry norms and standards.167
Increasing climate impacts have implications for the interpretation of fiduciary

80, N.C.‟s Commitment to Address Climate Change & Transition to a Clean Energy
Economy (Oct. 29, 2018); see also Climate Change, N.C. DEPT. OF ENVTL. QUALITY,
https://deq.nc.gov/energy-climate/climate-change [https://perma.cc/UV68-UZ2R] (last
visited Sept. 29, 2019). Oregon has committed to reducing GHG emissions by 10% below
1990 levels by 2020, and by 75% below 1990 levels by 2050. H.R. 3543, 74th Gen.
Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007); Meeting Our Goals, OREGON GLOBAL WARMING
COMMISSION, https://www.keeporegoncool.org/meeting-our-goals
[https://perma.cc/2URH-WMC2] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019) and Executive Order 20-04
‗Directing State Agencies to Take Actions to Reduce and Regulate Greenhouse Gas
Emissions‘ calling for a reduction of at least 45% by 2035 and 80% by 2050;
[https://www.oregon.gov/gov/Documents/executive_orders/eo_17-20.pdf] (last visited
Mar. 28, 2020). Moreover, California has also adopted a goal of transitioning to 100%
clean electricity power by 2045. See Camila Domonoske, California Sets Goal of 100
Percent Clean Electric Power by 2045, NPR (Sept. 10, 2018, 3:59 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2018/09/10/646373423/california-sets-goal-of-100-percentrenewable-electric-power-by-2045 [https://perma.cc/B8T9-H3FN]. California also has a
statutory commitment to reduce the state‘s emissions by 40% below 1990 levels by the
year 2030, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38566 (West 2017), as well as a
comprehensive set of climate change legislation. See California Climate Change
Legislation, CALIFORNIA CLIMATE CHANGE,
https://www.climatechange.ca.gov/state/legislation.html [https://perma.cc/6WB8-5E69]
(last visited Oct. 6, 2019). For a list of resources on state and municipal climate action, see
State and Local Climate Change Resource Center, SABIN CTR. FOR CLIMATE CHANGE L.,
http://columbiaclimatelaw.com/resources/archived-materials/state-and-local-climatechange-resource-center/ [https://perma.cc/L24C-59KU]
(last visited Sept. 29, 2019).
167
Joan M. Hemingway, Shareholder Wealth Maximization as a Function of Statutes,
Decisional Law and Organic Documents, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 939, 947 (2017)
(explaining broad definition of corporate director‘s duties in Delaware, the Model Business
Corporations Act, and across other states).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379848

38

THE ROAD TO PARIS

duties. Fiduciary duties remain ―largely agnostic‖ on climate change, allowing
directors and officers significant flexibility in how they approach transitions away
from fossil fuels.168 Fiduciary duties provide directors with sufficient flexibility to
accommodate climate risks, and directors have obligations to both assess and keep
informed of risks to their business, and consequentially to share this information
with investors.
A. Increasing Climate Risks for Carbon-Majors
Climate change and the failure of mitigation and adaptation efforts taken
together consistently rank in the top five global risks assessed by the World
Economic Forum in the past several years.169 The risks of climate change are
estimated to impact a significant portion of global assets, negatively impacting
global fiscal stability, with up to 30% of global manageable assets at risk.170
Between now and the end of the century, this could lead to between four to fortythree trillion dollars‘ worth of assets at risk.171
Climate risk can be separated into two main categories for corporations: (1)
the risks of transitioning to a lower-carbon economy, which may involve policy or
regulatory changes, as well as litigation, technology, market changes, and
reputational risks; and (2) the physical risks to operational assets of businesses,
which may be both acute and event-driven, as well as chronic, due to slow impacts
of climate change such as sea-level rise.172 In terms of the physical risks of climate
change, the Fourth National Climate Assessment has estimated that ―[m]ore
frequent and intense extreme weather [events] and climate-related events‖ will
―continue to damage infrastructure,‖ property, and labor productivity, and in the
energy arena will reduce the efficiency of power generation. 173 Climate impacts
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Hari M. Osofsky et al., Energy Re-Investment, 94 IND. L. J. 595, 638 (2019).
WORLD ECONOMIC FORUM, THE GLOBAL RISKS REPORT 2018 2, Fig. I (13th ed.
2018), http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GRR18_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8A9V62AG] (ranking failure of climate change adaptation and mitigation fifth out of top ten
global risks in terms of likelihood, and fourth in top ten risks in terms of impact in 2018).
170
Global manageable assets are the total stock of assets held by non-bank financial
institutions. THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, THE COST OF INACTION: RECOGNISING
RECOGNIZING THE VALUE AT RISK FROM CLIMATE CHANGE 8 (2015),
https://eiuperspectives.economist.com/sites/default/files/The%20cost%20of%20inaction_0.
pdf [https://perma.cc/EWQ3-EPLB].
171
Id. at 2; Allie Goldstein et al., The Private Sector‟s Climate Change Risk and
Adaptation Blind Spots, 9 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 18, 18 (2018).
172
TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES, supra note30, at 5–6.
173
U.S. GLOBAL CHANGE RESEARCH PROGRAM, FOURTH NATIONAL CLIMATE
ASSESSMENT: VOLUME II IMPACTS, RISKS, AND ADAPTATION IN THE UNITED STATES ii, 26
(2018),
https://nca2018.globalchange.gov/downloads/NCA4_2018_FullReport.pdf
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will also affect U.S. trade and the broader economy, disrupting operations and
supply chains both domestically and internationally, with annual losses in some
economic sectors reaching the hundreds of billions of dollars by the end of the
century. 174
While climate change threatens a wide variety of industries, the energy and
fossil fuel industries are particularly vulnerable. The energy infrastructures of
productive, refinement- and distribution-focused corporations are often located in
coastal areas and are vulnerable to sea-level rise, storm surges, and flooding.175
Decreased water and power supplies will also affect energy companies that rely on
these resources for the extraction and exploitation of fossil fuels. 176 Their
employees and customers will also be negatively affected. 177
Climate change also poses a new and intensified set of risks for the fossil
fuel industry from government policies and legislation, financial restrictions by
lenders and insurers, and hostile legal and shareholder actions. 178 These companies
can expect increased asset devaluations and increasing insurance and commodity
costs.179 They are also facing changing geopolitical conditions with declining
fortunes of petrostates, and challenges from new technology. 180 Financial risks are
also increasing, from stranded assets, divestment, and reduced wealth of fossil fuel
exporting countries, with investor-owned firms in the developed world likely to
feel the impacts of these cumulative risks sooner.181
The risks of climate change are not distant future risks; carbon-majors are
feeling the effects of climate change now. Natural disasters in 2017 in the United
States caused over $300 billion in damage nationwide, with effects being felt
acutely in Texas and Florida.182 Energy companies operating in the Gulf of Mexico

[https://perma.cc/DBA9-2QKQ].
174
Id.
175
Id. at 30–31.
176
Id. at 192–93.
177
Id. at 30.
178
Krane, supra note49, at 2–3.
179
Perry Wallace, Climate Change, Corporate Strategy, and Corporate Law Duties,
44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 757, 759 (2009).
180
Krane, supra note49, at 2.
181
Id. (noting, however, that risks will be felt at different time scales across the fossil
fuel industry with coal companies feeling the impacts sooner, and oil industry later as
fewer substitutes are available and transportation will continue to rely on oil).
182
CDP, STATE BY STATE: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. COMPANIES AND CITIES ACROSS
SEVEN
STATES
4
(Dec.
2018),
https://6fefcbb86e61af1b2fc4c70d8ead6ced550b4d987d7c03fcdd1d.ssl.cf3.rackcdn.com/cms/reports/documents/000/00
3/940/original/CDP_State_by_State_2018.pdf?1547134684 [https://perma.cc/5J8K-RG23].
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were particularly badly hit and continue to be worried about extreme events.183
Melting permafrost in the Artic also disrupts transportation routes, therefore
limiting operating capacity and increasing operational costs for extractive
corporations onshore.184 Risks extend internationally as well for these corporations
with capital intensive operating structures and assets situated in some of the most
vulnerable parts of the world to climate change.185 While energy companies are
some of the most exposed to climate risk, they demonstrate limited recognition, at
least publicly, to physical and other climate risks.186
The assumption that companies are failing to account for climate risk has
been borne out by quantitative research by Goldstein looking at 1,630 large
companies‘ voluntary reporting on climate change to investors.187 The report
concludes that companies were not adequately characterizing climate risk in their
voluntary reporting or adequately preparing for its impacts. 188 The authors found
that the potential magnitude of the financial impacts of climate risk was a key blind
spot for companies.189 Directors and managers were also failing to account for

183

Id. Noble Energy stated that the financial impacts of extreme weather events and
damages would not be fully recoverable for its operations in the Gulf due to insufficient
insurance and could negatively impact revenue. Dipka Bhambhani, Energy Companies
Could Feel The Effects of Climate Change on Their Bottom Lines, FORBES (Oct. 25, 2018,
1:43 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/dipkabhambhani/2018/10/25/energy-companiesfeel-the-effects-of-climate-change-where-it-hurts-the-bottom-line/#69cd1a952199
[https://perma.cc/H4YU-EYK3]. ExxonMobil incurred $135 million dollars of costs due to
property damage caused by flood debris damaging a pipeline under Yellowstone river in
Montana. Matthew Brown, Oil Spill: Yellowstone Spill to Cost Exxon $135M, BILLINGS
GAZETTE (Nov. 4 2011), https://billingsgazette.com/news/local/yellowstone-spill-to-costexxon-m/article_b231f3f4-0726-11e1-ada7-001cc4c03286.html [https://perma.cc/KFS2NFNH].
184
Bhambhani, supra note182. It should also be noted that while climate change may
be limiting onshore drilling, climate change is also breaking up arctic sea ice and opening
up new opportunities for offshore drilling in the Arctic.
185
ANDREW HOWARD & MARC HASSLER, SCHRODERS, CLIMATE CHANGE: THE
FORGOTTEN
PHYSICAL
RISKS
2
(July
2018),
https://www.schroders.com/en/sysglobalassets/_global-shared-blocks/climatechange/physical-risks.pdf [https://perma.cc/8WNW-Q4MA].
186
Id.
187
Goldstein et al., supra note171, at 18.
188
Id.
189
Id. It should be noted that the insurance industry has been one of the first-movers
on climate action, due to their high exposure. See, e.g., ALLIANZ GROUP & WORLD
WILDLIFE FUND, CLIMATE CHANGE AND INSURANCE: AN AGENDA FOR ACTION IN THE
UNITED
STATES,
UNIVERSITY
OF
MARYLAND
3
(2006),
http://www.climateneeds.umd.edu/pdf/AllianzWWFreport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CSQ7MALT].
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indirect and systemic characteristics of climate risk. 190 Companies are focusing
only on a narrow view of climate risk, perhaps in part due to a predisposition to
short-term thinking, the tendency to heavily discount future costs, and the potential
of disclosure of climate risks to lead to a corporate disadvantage in the short
term.191 Short-term thinking is cited as one of the most entrenched barriers to
progressive climate action by corporations.192 However, climate change is posing
both risks and opportunities for corporations, and new research points to
opportunities, even for carbon-majors, in the transition away from fossil fuels, as
discussed in the next section.
B. Increasing Climate Opportunities for Carbon-Majors
Even for carbon-major corporations, energy transitions away from fossil
fuels can be profitable. A recent report by Goldman Sachs highlights the
opportunities of a transition to a low carbon economy for global energy markets,
and in particular, for ‗Big Oils,‘ being the largest carbon-major corporations.193
The report anticipates that as a result of a lack of funding from financial
institutions for oil and gas projects in the near future, as well as key parts of the oil
value chain becoming stranded assets, the market in oil and gas will tighten. 194 The
report notes that, in the short-term, tightening financial conditions for
hydrocarbons may lead to higher returns for Big Oils as they consolidate their grip
on this industry; however, in the longer-term, the report argues that this funding
could be used by Big Oils to convert their business to Big Energy.195 This could be
achieved by leveraging their competitive advantages in global supply chain

190

Goldstein et al., supra note171, at 20–21, 23. While the authors focused only on
physical risks, they compared the estimated price tag of climate change in the trillions of
dollars with the aggregate financial risks reported from companies which only amounted to
tens of billions of dollars. Id. at 20.
191
Id. at 23.
192
Infra Section IV. B.
193
See generally GOLDMAN SACHS, RE-IMAGINING BIG OILS HOW ENERGY
COMPANIES
CAN
SUCCESSFULLY
ADAPT
TO
CLIMATE
CHANGE
(2018),
https://www.goldmansachs.com/insights/pages/reports/re-imagining-big-oils-f/reimagining-big-oils-report-pdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/GX4L-FN4W] (explaining the role that
Big Oil has in producing greenhouse gas emissions and detailing ways that Big Oil can
help with de-carbonization).
194
Id. at 15. Although it should be noted that in the natural gas industry U.S. markets
are flooded and prices are expected to stay low for some time. Ryan Dezember, U.S. Glut
in Natural-Gas Supply Goes Global, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 27, 2019, 3:11 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-glut-in-natural-gas-supply-goes-global-11566907200
[https://perma.cc/J3Q9-A6XY].
195
GOLDMAN SACHS, supra note193, at 3.
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management, technical expertise, and global footprints to replicate vertical
integration in energy by purchasing utilities and providing energy from diversified
sources, including biofuels and renewables.196 Most importantly, this report
highlights the business case for transition, stating that the blended returns on these
new investments could be materially higher than returns in the past decade on just
oil and gas.197
The second wave of litigation also highlights the risks of climate change to
investors in these corporations. Armed with more and better information about
climate risk, investors could also put increased pressure on directors to act on the
financial risks and opportunities posed by climate change. A recent report from
Wood Mckenzie connects increasing pressure from investors for transparency
regarding emissions to capital market responses.198 The report notes that investors
will increasingly seek new instruments for green social investments. Combined
with drivers of the transition to renewables and electrification of transport, the
report estimates that a ―point of singularity‖ will emerge in 2035, where the global
energy transition away from fossil fuels will be unstoppable and new energy
sources will become the dominant choice for investments. 199
This transition will be supported by an ―almost ubiquitous‖ societal push
towards a sustainable future.200 The global energy transition is information that
directors cannot afford to ignore while maintaining their managerial decisions and
capital investment choices safely within the realm of compliance with fiduciary
duties. Institutional investors are well-resourced and experienced litigants,201 and
corporate lawsuits could become increasingly popular if directors do not take the
risks of climate change to their businesses more seriously and do not consider
energy transitions as part of their strategic business plans. Research that
demonstrates the financial benefits of the global energy transition specifically for
carbon-major corporations takes the issue beyond zero-sum environmentalism,202
to a legitimate business decision. Therefore, the risks of climate change combined
with the business case for transition may lead to cleaner energy choices by
directors.
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AND
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EXECUTIVE
SUMMARY
(Jun.
2018),
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[https://perma.cc/3R69B7H6].
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Id. at 1.
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202
See generally, Shalanda Baker et al., Beyond Zero-Sum Environmentalism, 47 ENV.
L. REP. 4 (2017).
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Despite the opportunities for transition available to carbon-major
corporations, they have largely failed to seize these opportunities. The response
has been uneven, with Shell recently announcing short-term caps on emissions as a
result of investor pressure,203 but with most U.S.-based carbon-majors, such as
ExxonMobil, doubling down on investments in fossil fuels, and ignoring the risks
of climate change to their businesses and to society.204 This renewed investment in
fossil fuels is based on the perception that efforts to reduce emissions undermine
short-term commercial opportunities to monetize existing fossil fuel reserves.205
However, the failure of climate policy is likely to broaden risks across the global
economy and increase risks to assets of carbon-majors.206 These short-term
decisions leave carbon-major directors even more exposed to continued climate
litigation.
C. Corporate Law-Based Climate Litigation
Several suits and investigations have been launched in the United States that
involve corporate and securities law, including securities disclosure claims,207 as
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Shell Agrees to Set Short-Term Caps on Carbon Emissions, FIN. POST (Dec. 3,
2018, 3:06 PM), https://business.financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/shell-agrees-to-setshort-term-caps-on-carbon-emissions [https://perma.cc/X7WK-NARA].
204
Crude
Awakening,
THE
ECONOMIST
(Feb.
7,
2019),
https://gbr.businessreview.global/articles/view/5c6f7846c5be1300076c9094
[https://perma.cc/VYS6-MWG9].
205
Krane, supra note49, at 1.
206
Id. at 3.
207
While this article focuses on directors‘ fiduciary duties, the fiduciary duties of
pension fund managers has also been litigated and recently dismissed by a Texas court. In
Fentress v. ExxonMobil Corp, a class action suit was brought by employees of the Exxon
Savings Plan on the basis that senior corporate officers of the company, who were
fiduciaries of the employee stock pension plan, knew or should have known that the stock
was artificially inflated due to the risks of climate change. 304 F. Supp. 3d 569, 572 (S.D.
Tex. 2018). The plaintiffs claimed that the pension managers purchased $800 million worth
of Exxon stocks despite the climate change risks, and the company should have written
down its assets as stranded, claiming this was a breach of the duty of prudence, which
required fiduciaries to manage the assets with care, skill, prudence and diligence pursuant
to 29 U.S.C. §§ 1104(a)(1)(B). Fentress, 304 F. Supp. 3d at 573–74. A motion to dismiss
by Exxon on March 30, 2018 was granted by the Texas court on the basis that the plaintiffs
failed to show the risks of climate change had not already been included in the stock price.
Id. at 580, 587. Relying on the efficient market hypothesis, the judge decided that the
markets could take into account public information on climate change, and the plaintiffs
had not plausibly linked the realities of climate change to the future health of an oil and gas
company. Id. at 576–79. The issue of fiduciary duties for pension fund managers became a
relevant one in the case, with the plaintiffs having to prove that the duty of prudence had
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well as investigations by the New York and Massachusetts Attorneys General.208
This section will focus on a new case that turned on fiduciary duties in the context

been violated on the basis of non-public information. Id. at 580–81. In order to prove a
breach of fiduciary duty, the plaintiffs would have to prove that an alternative action was
available that was so clearly beneficial that a prudent fiduciary could not conclude it would
be more likely to harm the fund than help it. Id. The plaintiffs put forward three alternative
actions: corrective disclosures regarding Exxon‘s reserves, halting new purchase orders of
Exxon stock, and investing in low-cost hedging stock. Id. at 574. These were all dismissed
as inappropriate by the judge on the basis that corrective disclosures and freezing stock
trading would ultimately lower the price of the stock and could do more harm than good.
Id. at 580–87. While unsuccessful here, more suits regarding lack of disclosure by private
plaintiffs in the context of fiduciary duties are likely to continue where stock prices drop.
208
In November 2015, the New York Attorney General served Exxon with a subpoena
pursuant to N.Y. EXECUTIVE LAW § 63(12) (Consol. 2019), N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 2302(a)
(Consol. 2019), and the Martin Act, N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 352 (McKinney 2019)). Exxon
Mobil Corp. v. Schneiderman, 316 F. Supp. 3d 679, 687 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Together, these
laws prohibit fraudulent practices in connection with securities sold in New York. See id.
New York also subpoenaed PricewaterhouseCoopers in August 2016 in connection with
the Exxon Mobil investigation. Decision & Order at 1, People v. PricewaterhouseCoopers
LLP, No. 451962/16 (N.Y.S. Oct. 26, 2016), Doc. 41. New York‘s investigation is
designed to discover whether Exxon‘s historical securities filings were misleading because
they failed to disclose Exxon‘s internal projections regarding the potential costs of both
climate change and climate change regulation to the company. Memorandum of Law in
Support of Motion to Compel Compliance with Investigative Subpoena at 3–6, People v.
PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP, No. 451962/2016 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 21, 2016), Doc. 38.
In April 2016, the Massachusetts Attorney General served Exxon with a Civil Investigative
Demand pursuing fraudulent claims similar to those pursued by the New York Attorney
General. Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Attorney General, 94 N.E. 786, 790 (Mass. 2018). The
Massachusetts Attorney General requested from Exxon documents regarding whether the
potential for stranded assets should have been disclosed. See Brief of Appellee Office of
the Attorney General Commonwealth of Massachusetts at 14–15, Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Attorney General, 94 N.E. 786 (Mass. 2018) (No. SJC-12376). In response, Exxon sued the
Attorneys General of New York and Massachusetts for abuse of process, civil conspiracy
and violations of Exxon‘s constitutional rights to free speech. Exxon Mobil Corp. v.
Schneiderman, 316 F. Supp. 3d 679, 688 (S.D.N.Y. 2018). Exxon claimed the
investigations were designed to ―silence and intimidate one side of the public policy debate
on how to address climate change.‖ Id. at 688. A decision in March 2018 in the United
States district court in New York provided a scathing order dismissing the motions by
Exxon as a ―wild stretch of logic.‖ Id. at 689. In spite of Exxon‘s judicial protests, it
appears that these investigations might bear fruit, as the Attorney General of New York
recently settled with Peabody Energy, requiring a restatement of its financial disclosures.
Press Release, New York Attorney General, A.G. Schneiderman Secures Unprecedented
Agreement with Peabody Energy to End Misleading Statements and Disclose Risks Arising
From Climate Change (Nov. 9, 2015), https://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneidermansecures-unprecedented-agreement-peabody-energy-end-misleading
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of securities disclosures and corporate statements about climate risks. In 2017, a
suit was launched regarding misleading Exxon reserves in Ramirez v.
ExxonMobil.209 The plaintiffs in Ramirez were successful at the pleadings stage,
and the suit is continuing. The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas, in August 2018, held that the plaintiffs, the Greater Pennsylvania
Carpenters Pension Fund, successfully pleaded alleged material misrepresentations
or omissions constituting securities fraud by ExxonMobil and a breach of the duty
of loyalty by a number of its corporate directors and officers, regarding losses
attributed to publicly traded stock acquired between 2014 and 2017.210 These
losses were attributed by the plaintiffs to the failure by the directors and financial
officers of ExxonMobil to recognize and inform investors of the business risks of
climate change, and the value impairment of unconventional fossil fuel operations
in the Canadian tar sands, the Rocky Mountain Dry Gas Operation, and Kearl
Operations.211 The directors‘ actions led, in 2016, to the company disclosing that
20% of its once proved reserves were no longer economically feasible, and
therefore fell outside of the SEC definition of proved reserves, leading to a $2
billion impairment announcement in 2017.212
The Ramirez plaintiffs alleged securities fraud under Sections 10(b) and
20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act 1934 and Rule 10b-5.213 The plaintiffs were
successful at pleading material misstatement, including by omission, a breach of
the duty of loyalty by the company and its officers in understating the proxy cost
of carbon used, and for misstatements made in Form 10-K, and in its Corporate
Outlook.214 Their pleading was successful enough to survive a 12(b)(6) motion,
based on assertions that as shareholders they were misled by statements made by
directors and officers in the company‘s policy documents.215 These statements

[https://perma.cc/PFN9-SRKL]. In October 2018, the New York Attorney General filed a
lawsuit against Exxon for defrauding investors over the financial risks of climate change
due to changing climate change regulation. Summons & Complaint at 1, People v. Exxon
Mobil Corp, No. 452044/2018 (N.Y. App. Div. Oct. 24, 2018), Doc. 1. However, in
December 2019, the court dismissed New York‘s Martin Act claim against Exxon. John
Schwartz, New York Loses Climate Change Fraud Case Against Exxon Mobil, N.Y. TIMES
(Dec. 10, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2sdIAYF [https://perma.cc/8BWX-YJFC].
209
Ramirez v. ExxonMobil, 334 F. Supp. 3d 832, 840 (N.D. Tex. 2018).
210
Id. at 839–40.
211
Id.
212
ExxonMobil Earns $7.8 Billion in 2016; $1.7 Billion During Fourth Quarter,
EXXONMOBIL,
https://cdn.exxonmobil.com/~/media/global/files/earnings/2016/news_release_earnings_4q
16.pdf [https://perma.cc/NV2W-2DWH].
213
Ramirez, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 839.
214
Id. at 847.
215
Id. at 859.
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were misleading in that they stated that the company was properly considering the
potential for changing climate regulations as well as carbon asset risks and climate
risks to its business.216
Ramirez focuses specifically on directors‘ duties and duties to disclose
relevant information on climate change and climate risk to shareholders in the
securities context. The case is evidence of the growing use and relevance of
corporate and securities law, and more specifically, fiduciary duties in the context
of climate change litigation.217
D. Fiduciary Duties in the Context of Climate Risk
In the absence of takeover circumstances, directors have obligations to
manage the business in the best interests of the corporation and have the flexibility
to take a long-term management approach.218 Fiduciary duties are made up of two
primary duties: those of care and loyalty. 219 The duty of care requires that directors

216

Id.
For example, see new shareholder derivative actions in Montini v. Woods and
Colditz v. Woods. See Complaint at 120, Montini v. Woods, No. 3.19-cv-01068-K (N.D.
Tex. May 2, 2019), Doc. 1; Complaint for Petitioner at 121, Colditz v. Woods, No. 3.19cv-01067 (N.D. Tex. May 2, 2019), Doc. 1.
218
See, e.g., Katz v. Oak Industries Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 876 (Del. Ch. 1986). The Revlon
doctrine applies in takeover circumstances in Delaware and holds that directors in takeover
circumstances can deviate from the business judgment rule and focus on the short-term
interests of stockholders instead of the long-term interest of the corporation. See Derek J.
Famulari, The Revlon Doctrine – the Fiduciary Duties of Directors when Targets of
Corporate Takeovers and Mergers, AM. BAR ASS‘N,
https://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/young_lawyers/publications/
101/fiduciary_duties_of_directors_coporate_takeover.authcheckdam.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8GMU-LYG6] (last visited Sept. 29, 2019) (discussing Revlon Inc. v
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)); Joshua Fershee, Is the
Revlon Doctrine Creeping into the Business Judgement Rule? (No), BUSINESS LAW PROF
BLOG (Sept. 17, 2010), https://lawprofessors.typepad.com/business_law/2010/09/is-therevlon-duty-creeping-into-the-business-judgment-rule-no.html [https://perma.cc/VX6FVB2N]; see also Andrew A. Schwartz, The Perpetual Corporation, 80 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 764, 783 (2012) (highlighting that given the perpetual existence of corporations,
―immortal investing‖ should be the guiding principle for corporate directors, which would
have public benefits including acting as stewards for natural resources).
219
See Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362, 367 (Del. 2006) (subsuming the duty of good faith
under the duty of loyalty leaving only the duties of care and loyalty as stand-alone,
independent duties); see also Stephen Bainbridge, Good Faith in Delaware After Stone v
Ritter, STEPHEN BRAINBRIDGE‘S J. OF L., RELIGION, POLITICS, & CULTURE (Jan. 3, 2007),
https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2007/01/good-faith-indelaware-after-stone-v-ritter.html [https://perma.cc/BF48-M2SU].
217
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make decisions in a carefully considered manner.220 Courts want to know that
directors have considered all material information reasonably available to them,
and this now includes climate risks and opportunities based on the best
scientifically available information and best industry practice. 221 The duty of care
could be applicable where directors fail to take into account material information
regarding the risks climate change poses to their businesses, with courts focusing
on the process of the directors‘ decision-making, and whether the decisions were
made in good faith.222
The duty of loyalty, as interpreted by Delaware Supreme Court in Stone v
Ritter,223 provides that directors have a responsibility to ensure that appropriate
information and reporting systems are established by management to ensure
compliance with key regulatory regimes.224 The duty of loyalty can be violated if
directors demonstrate a conscious disregard for their responsibilities.225 Such
disregard will demonstrate that they have not discharged their fiduciary obligations

220

See STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATE LAW 125 (2d ed. 2009).
See Barker, supra note31, at 200–02.
222
See Wallace, supra note179, at 764.
223
Stone, 911 A.2d at 371. The decision is not without its critics, with Bainbridge
stating that this intentional failure to act constituting a breach of the duty of loyalty guts the
business judgment rule. See Stephen Bainbridge, Stone v. Ritter: Directors Caremark
Oversight Duties, STEPHEN BAINBRIDGE‘S J. OF L., RELIGION, POLITICS, & CULTURE (Jan.
3, 2007), https://www.professorbainbridge.com/professorbainbridgecom/2007/01/stone-vritter-directors-caremark-oversight-duties.html
[https://perma.cc/NY4V-2NVF]
[hereinafter Bainbridge, Stone v. Ritter].
224
Stone, 911 A.2d at 368–71 (applying In Re Caremark International Inc. Derivative
Litigation, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996)). The ―Caremark‘ duties‖ are often referred to as
the fiduciary duty of oversight. See Bainbridge, Stone v. Ritter, supra note 223 (noting that
Stone v. Ritter reinterprets the Caremark duties of oversight as duties of good faith and
loyalty and not those of care).
225
See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370. The Caremark case illustrated that, in limited
circumstances, high profile oversight failures could be regarded as not just gross
negligence by directors but instead as acts of disloyalty for sustainable or systemic failure
to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists, and illustrates the
increasing importance of board function under Delaware law, as well as the need for the
Board to be fully informed. Wallace, supra note179, at 761 (noting, however, that the
subsequent Citigroup derivative action suit, In Re Citigroup Inc Shareholder Derivative
Litigation, 964 A 2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009), casts doubt on the Caremark approach). Marc
Moore highlights how difficult this threshold is to reach in Delaware Courts in the area of
systemic risk oversight, citing the Citigroup shareholder derivative litigation. See Marc T.
Moore, Redressing Risk Oversight Failure in UK and US Listed Companies: Lessons from
the RBS and Citigroup Litigation, 18 EUR. BUS. ORG. LAW REV. 733, 743–46 (2017)
(noting that security disclosure violations may be a more successful route to addressing
systemic risk failures by directors than directors‘ duties).
221
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in good faith.226 Similarly, according to the Delaware Supreme Court in In Re Walt
Disney Company Derivative Litigation (the Disney case),227 acts of bad faith
include where a director intentionally acts with a purpose other than that of
advancing the best interests of the corporation, where she acts with the intention to
violate applicable law or intentionally fails to act in the face of a known duty to
act, demonstrating a conscious disregard for her duties.228 Combined, these duties
of care and loyalty focus the courts‘ attention on whether the director was fully
informed, disinterested, and independent in her decision making.
The business judgment rule is a largely process-based rule as defined in
Delaware, and used by courts to assess directors‘ decisions and whether those
decisions complied with their directors‘ duties. 229 Under this rule, the court is not
concerned with the content of the decision made by a director, but instead with the
process by which the decision was made.230 Absent illegality, fraud or self-dealing,
courts under the business judgment rule presume that directors have employed
their own appropriate business judgment to the issue at hand.231 The court will
assess ―the good faith or rationality of the process employed.‖232 However, as a
result of this emphasis on process, even if the outcome is ill-advised, courts are
unlikely to intervene, provided the director‘s decision is the product of good faith
and a rational process.233 Fershee notes that the increasing focus on profitmaking
by directors may narrow directors‘ decision-making power.234 He notes that this

226

See In Re Caremark Intl. Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 (Del. Ch.

1996).
227

In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006).
Id. at 67. Wallace notes that Stone v. Ritter requires that directors must have been
conscious of the fact they were not monitoring and requires ‗persistent indolence‘ on their
party in order for a claim of oversight failure to be successful, although he notes the duty of
oversight is distinguishable from the duty of care to take decisions on strategic climate
action. Wallace, supra note179, at 761.
229
See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984); Stone, 911 A.2d at 370; In
re Caremark Int‘l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d at 970–71; Hanson Tr. PLC v. ML SCM
Acquisition, Inc., 781 F. 2d 264, 274–76 (2d Cir. 1986); Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244,
262–64 (Del. 2000).
230
See Stone, 911 A.2d at 367.
231
See Brehm, 746 A.2d at 255.
232
In re Caremark Int‘l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d at 967. Elhauge argues that the
business judgment rule was established as courts could not figure out what maximizes
profits, and so rely on directors to do so. See Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits
in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733, 743 (2005).
233
See Bainbridge, Stone v. Ritter, supra note223.
234
Joshua P. Fershee, The End of Responsible Growth and Governance?: The Risks
Posed by Social Enterprise Enabling Statutes and the Demise of Director Primacy, 19
TENN. J. BUS. L. 361, 363 (2018) (pointing out there is no reason for a community service
mission to itself to not serve the purpose of promoting the value of the corporation for the
228
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increasing turn in Delaware towards profitability may convert the business
judgment rule away from an abstention rule to a more intrusive standard assumed
by courts, marking a significant departure from its historical interpretations.235
There is a presumption that, in order to benefit from the business judgment
rule, directors must have informed themselves of all material information and acted
with care on the basis of that information. 236 Directors should also act in
accordance with their duties of loyalty and care.
The case of Pfeffer v. Redstone237 established that making a materially false or
misleading statement to shareholders can violate state law fiduciary duties. 238 In
the securities law context, according to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in
Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers District Council Constr. Ind. Pens. Fund,239 directors
breach their duty of loyalty if their statements to shareholders are not honest, and
this includes where the directors‘ opinion is not honestly held.240 If facts such as
the risks of climate change to the business are either held by the company or are
within the knowledge of directors, and would undermine any opinion given by
directors to shareholders, this could lead to personal liability for breach of the duty
of loyalty.241

benefit of its shareholders).
235
Id.
236
See Robert T. Miller, Wrongful Omissions by Corporate Directors: Stone v. Ritter
and Adapting the Process Model of the Delaware Business Judgement Rule, 10 U. PA. J.
BUS. & EMP. L. 911, 912–13 (2008) (noting that violation of directors‘ duties for omission
is one of the most difficult to prove, depending on whether a director failed to consider
acting at all, or considered an action and then decided not to act).
237
965 A.2d 676 (Del. 2009).
238
Id. at 684.
239
Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Industry Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct.
1318, 1327 (2015).
240
Id. There can also be links between fiduciary duties and federal securities law in
that federal securities law may implicate state law fiduciary duties.
241
Cynthia A. Williams, Hearing Before the Philippines Human Rights Commission,
New York (Sept. 28, 2018) (on file with author). Cynthia A. Williams and David Estrin
submitted a summary of recommended measures to the Philippines Commission on Human
Rights Inquiry at the hearing in New York on 28th September 2018 outlining a number of
legal obligations of officers and directors of carbon major enterprises and their investors, as
well as recommended voluntary actions by these entities, including committing to
corporate policies and actions to achieve emission reductions and decarbonisation of their
primary energy supplies, develop specific business plans and investment allocation to
ensure peaking of carbon emissions by 2020 using minimum disclosure expectations set
out
in
the
Transition
Pathway
Initiative,
2018
REPORT
(2018),
www.les.ac.uk/granthaminstitute/tpi, and to have the plans peer-reviewed.. They
recommend these actions be backstopped by government requirements. Copy on file with
author.

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379848

50

THE ROAD TO PARIS

At the pleadings stage, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of
Texas in Ramirez paid significant attention to the Omnicare decision in the context
of material misstatements made by officers of ExxonMobil. 242 While Exxon
attempted to rely on the Omnicare decision by characterizing its asset valuations
and impairment statements as opinions only, the court was clear that if underlying
facts are not provided to shareholders, and contradict statements made, that can
render directors‘ statements misleading by omission.243 The Ramirez court noted
that, according to the Omnicare standard, even if the speaker genuinely holds
opinions expressed, it could still constitute a material misstatement by omission if
the speaker omits material facts about the speaker‘s inquiry into or knowledge
concerning a statement of opinion if those omitted facts conflict with what a
reasonable investor would take from the statements.244 Based on a Fifth Circuit
decision, which held that alleged accounting violations are sufficient to plead
material misstatements, the Ramirez court stated that ExxonMobil‘s officers‘
alleged GAAP violations and opinions regarding the Rocky Mountain Dry Gas
Operation not being impaired necessarily omitted particular facts which made their
opinions materially misleading.245 The officers‘ positions on the board and their
familiarity with the proxy cost for carbon used by the company exposed them to a
potential breach of their directors‘ duties.246
Increased litigation and escalating climate risks, therefore, have legal
implications for directors‘ and officers‘ liability. Impact litigation against carbonmajor corporations raises the risk metrics of climate change for their businesses,
and also raises the profile of climate change for directors and investors. Directors
will breach their duties of care and loyalty if they fail to understand the risks of
climate change to their business and, where these risks are considerable, have
failed to convey these risks to shareholders. Barker and Winter note that the law
―does not tolerate decisions based on uninformed assumptions, or that arise by
default from a failure to turn the directional mind to a relevant issue.‖ 247 Directors
will also be liable if they utterly failed to implement a reporting and information
system which is commensurate with corresponding risks to the business and legal
obligations, or, if having implemented such a system, they consciously failed to
monitor or oversee its operations, thus disabling themselves from being informed

242

Ramirez, 334 F. Supp. 3d at 839.
Id. at 848.
244
Id. at 847–48.
245
Id. at 848 (citing Barrie v. Intervoice-Brite, Inc., 397 F.3d 249, 257–58 (5th Cir.
2006)).
246
Id. at 851–54.
247
Sarah Barker & Kurt Winter, Changing Balance of Evidence, ESG MAGAZINE,
Winter 2016, at 46.
243
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of risks or problems requiring their attention.248 Both limbs of the test require a
showing that directors knew they were not discharging their fiduciary obligations
in order for liability to be imposed.249 Barker notes that, in relation to stranded
assets, directors who consciously disregard or are willfully blind to stranded asset
risks through, for example, ‗default denialism‘ consistent with industry-based or
partisan political affiliations, may be subject to a claim that they failed to discharge
their duty to prioritize the best interests of the company. 250 A changing balance of
evidence from science suggests that a shift is occurring from climate change being
seen merely as an ethical concern, to a significant financial concern for carbonmajor corporations and their investors, meaning directors are legally obligated to
consider climate risks.251 Directors would have direct and actual notice of climate
risk as a result of regulatory investigations or litigation brought against their own
company, and potentially by suits brought against other fossil fuel corporations.252
While Ramirez has just passed the pleadings stage, the case provides an important
example of how existing fiduciary duties could require directors of public
companies with securities duties to disclose information to shareholders about
climate change and climate risk.
The rise of this second wave of litigation, therefore, increases the materiality
of the risks of climate change to businesses and investors in those businesses and
consequentially affects corporate governance. According to the Omnicare decision,
directors will be at risk of breaching the duty of loyalty if they do not act
appropriately with their shareholders, meaning they should inform their
shareholders of the transition risks of climate change.253 Transition risks include
increased regulation on climate change, which may affect the bottom lines of these
businesses.254 Increased disclosure by directors to investors of both the material
financial risks of climate change as well as transition risks are also being
demanded by investors independent of litigation through shareholder proposals
submitted at annual general meetings (AGMs).255 Directors are unlikely to be able

248

See Stone, 911 A.2d at 370 (Del. 2006). Stone involved the lack of implementation
of a risk-based system in relation to anti-money laundering legal obligations and
knowledge by the directors that they were not complying with their fiduciary duties is a
requirement. This obligation will be more relevant where directors have legal obligations
around emissions. See Bainbridge, Stone v. Ritter, supra note 223.
249
Bainbridge, Stone v. Ritter, supra note223.
250
Barker, supra note31, at 211.
251
Barker & Winter, supra note247, at 46.
252
Barker, supra note31, at 212–13.
253
See Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers Dist. Council Constr. Industry Pension Fund, 135 S.
Ct. 1318, 1327 (2015).
254
See supra Section III.A.
255
See, e.g., AIMING FOR A COALITION, SPECIAL RESOLUTION – STRATEGIC RESILIENCE
FOR
2035
AND
BEYOND
(2015),
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to ward off shareholder proposals, and the issue is likely to remain an agenda item
at AGMs.
In April and May 2015, at the AGMs of both BP and Royal Dutch Shell,
shareholder resolutions supported by a majority of shareholders as well as by
management were passed.256 The shareholder resolutions requested enhanced
reporting by these corporations on their exposure to climate change, including
portfolio resistance to the International Energy Agency‘s 2030 energy scenarios.257
They also requested further information on operational environmental management
and public policy positions on climate change.258 The resolutions were submitted
specifically in light of the Paris Agreement negotiations.259 The reasoning behind
the shareholder resolution, as shared by ―Aiming for A,‖ was to understand how
these corporations were preparing for the low-carbon transition, reveal systemic
risks that may impact investors, and engage in more collective fiduciary duties and
enhance shareholder voice on climate change.260
In 2015 and 2016, similar resolutions requesting more action on climate
change, including increased disclosure and the long-term portfolio impacts of
climate change regulations and policies, were put forward at the AGMs of
ExxonMobil and Chevron.261 The Exxon resolution was not accepted by the
majority of shareholders.262 Shareholders did, however, pass a resolution that could
enable them to appoint board members with expertise in climate change.263 In
2017, shareholders of Occidental Petroleum approved a shareholder proposal
requiring that the company disclose the business impacts of climate change. 264 This

https://www.iccr.org/sites/default/files/resources_attachments/royaldutchshell2015resolutio
n.pdf [https://perma.cc/WZQ2-36UE].
256
Megan Darby, BP Adopts Climate Risk Proposal After Shareholder Vote, CLIMATE
CHANGE
NEWS
(Apr.
16,
2015,
3:02
PM),
https://www.climatechangenews.com/2015/04/16/bp-adopts-climate-risk-proposal-aftershareholder-vote/ [https://perma.cc/EV8F-W46G].
257
AIMING FOR A COALITION, supra note255.
258
Id.
259
Id.
260
Id.
261
Karen Savage, Climate Proposals Fail at Exxon, Chevron Shareholder Meetings,
CLIMATE
LIABILITY
NEWS
(May
29,
2019),
https://www.climateliabilitynews.org/2019/05/29/climate-proposals-exxon-chevron/
[https://perma.cc/RA3U-RD55].
262
Id.
263
Rupert Neate, ExxonMobil CEO: Ending Oil Production „Not Acceptable for
Humanity‟,
GUARDIAN
(May
25,
2016,
3:25
PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/may/25/exxonmobil-ceo-oil-climate-changeoil-production [https://perma.cc/2M99-SNGP].
264
Emily Chasan, Occidental Holders Override Board in Approving Climate Proposal,
BLOOMBERG (May 12, 2017, 8:02 AM), bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379848

THE ROAD TO PARIS

53

vote marks the first time that a climate-related shareholder resolution was passed
over the objections of the board.265
A number of carbon-major corporations, including Exxon, in relation to the
2016 shareholder resolutions, applied to the SEC under Rule 14a-8(i)(3) requesting
permission to exclude these proposals from proxy materials to be circulated to
shareholders on the basis that they were vague or indefinite.266 The SEC, in all
cases, disagreed, meaning that these corporations had to include the shareholder
proposals in proxy materials, allowing all shareholders to vote on them.267 Renssen
notes that climate litigation has been given a ―new lease on life‖ partly due to these
shareholder actions targeting carbon-majors.268

12/blackrock-to-back-climate-shareholder-proposal-at-occidental [https://perma.cc/4YVFZNMV].
265
It is important to note that shareholder proposals on their own are not binding on
the corporation.
266
Exxon Mobil Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter (Apr. 2, 2019),
https://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/cf-noaction/14a-8/2019/adamseitchik04021914a8.pdf [https://perma.cc/527Z-MQQC].
267
However, the SEC allowed the company to reject a shareholder submission
requesting ExxonMobil to set emissions targets consistent with the Paris Agreement. See
Gary McWilliams, U.S. Regulator Rules Out Exxon Shareholder Vote on Climate
Resolution, REUTERS (Apr. 2, 2019, 2:46 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usaexxon-mobil-climatechange/u-s-regulator-rules-out-exxon-shareholder-vote-on-climateresolution-idUSKCN1RE2E5 [https://perma.cc/Y5Z6-8DQV].
268
Renssen, supra note60, at 655. In 2010, the SEC issued guidance to investors regarding
disclosures obligations in the context of climate change. Commission Guidance Regarding
Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. 6290, 6296 (Feb. 8, 2010)
(interpreting 17 C.F.R. pts 211, 231, 241). The SEC guidance lists several disclosure
obligations which may be relevant, including Securities Act Rule 408 and the Exchange
Act Rule 12b-20, which requires registrants to disclose further ―material‖ information as
may be necessary to ensure that statements are not misleading. Commission Guidance
Regarding Disclosure Related to Climate Change, 75 Fed. Reg. at 6293–94. In Basic v.
Levinson, the U.S. Supreme Court deemed a consideration to be material ―if there is a
substantial likelihood that a reasonable shareholder would consider it important in deciding
how to vote.‖ 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988). While there has been very little action by the SEC
in relation to its 2010 guidance, the legal requirement to disclose under the Securities Act
of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d-1(a)(4), (5) (2012), remains. The Act requires disclosure of
material information which would ensure that the filing was not ―misleading.‖ 17 CFR §
229.103 (Item 103). Further, the increasing number of extra-judicial resolutions submitted
by shareholders against carbon major corporations requesting disclosure of the risks of
climate change may exemplify that climate change itself is now considered material by
shareholders. In addition, Item 103 of Regulation S-K requires a registrant to briefly
describe any material pending legal proceedings to which it or its subsidiaries may be a
party to. 17 CFR § 229.103 (Item 103). Item 303 of Regulation S-K requires disclosure of
Management‘s Discussion and Analysis of Financial Conditions and Results of Operations

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379848

54

THE ROAD TO PARIS

Fiduciary duties not only require directors to identify and assess climate risks
but can also provide tools for directors to consider and address the risks of climate
change. Heminway notes that corporate law in the social enterprise context
remains, at least in some states, a very flexible legal tool. 269 She states that
corporate law provides sufficient flexibility to directors in for-profit companies to
consider what is best for shareholders in the long term, and can incorporate social
enterprise approaches that consider shareholder wealth maximization. 270
E. Shareholder Wealth Maximization and Climate Risk
The shareholder wealth maximization norm is often seen as a barrier to
climate action, but in fact, the norm is primarily focused on the long-term
profitability of the corporation. It is the most dominant norm undergirding U.S.
corporate law and fiduciary duties in particular.271 While not reflected in statutory

(or MD&A) to enable investors to see the registrant entity from the perspective of
management. Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (Item 303). This statement should
identify known trends, events, demands and uncertainties that are reasonably likely to have
a material effect on the financial condition or operating performance of the registrant. 17
C.F.R. § 229.303 (Item 303) The SEC guidance notes that the time horizon is not specified
for the MD&A analysis and will depend on the registrant‘s particular circumstances. 75
Fed. Reg. at 6290, 6296. The risk factors assessed should include regulation, scientific and
technological updates, as well as physical risks of climate change. See 75 Fed. Reg. at
6290, 6296; see also Wallace supra note179, at 776 (noting that directors may determine
that litigation risk does not reach the level of materiality that would require disclosure
under Item 103 of Regulation S-K, assuming the litigation may not succeed due to
causation hurdles, but that the MD&A disclosures may be a more potent tool for climate
change disclosures, and that combined with political, economic and ―advocacy-driven
public consciousness,‖ federal securities law could be the ―main impetus for corporate
action‖).
269
Joan MacLeod Heminway, Let‟s Not Give Up on Traditional For-Profit
Corporations for Sustainable Social Enterprise, 86 UMKC L. REV. 779, 786 (2018).
270
Id.
271
There are a variety of theoretical normative approaches to the objective of the
corporation. Shareholder primacy was originally based on shareholders as owners of the
company or, alternatively according to agency theorists, that shareholders own residual
claims over corporate assets. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note45, at 1436. The ownership
theory has been supplanted by the nexus of contracts or contractarian theories, which
evolved from Coase transactional costs theories, and generally characterise the corporation
as a nexus or series of default contracts, and particularly as a species of private law. Id. at
1430. For a description of the varieties of theoretical approaches in the contractarian vein,
see Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note45, at 606. For a critique of this approach to
the corporation, see William W. Bratton, Jr., The New Economic Theory of the Firm:
Critical Perspectives from History, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1527 (1989). Contractarian
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obligations, its normative power is still considerable, and it has been deemed a
―fundamental norm‖ guiding corporate decision making, particularly in Delaware.
Fershee has noted that recent Delaware cases and judicial writings have elevated
this norm to a more ―singular and narrow obligation for for-profit entities.‖272
Norms are powerful tools in corporate law. Corporate actors, such as directors, are
often influenced by corporate culture and norm-based standards.273 So while often
criticized, it is important to determine where synergies or complementarities
between shareholder wealth maximization and climate risks to corporations can be
found.
Contractarian theory characterizes the corporation as a nexus or series of
private, default contracts or reciprocal arrangements between constituents who
have a stake in its operations and profitability. 274 As these contracts are necessarily
incomplete, fiduciary duties stand as ―gap fillers,‖ available to courts where cracks
or holes in these contracts between shareholders and corporate officers and
directors appear.275 The hypothetical bargain analysis asks what contractual terms
rational parties would have agreed to had they addressed these gaps ex ante, and
the prevailing theoretical view is that they would have agreed to maximize

theories are not uncontested. Lipton and Rosenblum contest the private characterization of
corporations, pointing to their ties to the state and public welfare histories. In particular,
they put forward an alternative model of the corporation as an entity, having its own
independent interests in long-term business success. Martin Lipton & Steven A.
Rosenblum, A New System of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of
Directors, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 187, 189, 202–03 (1991). Blair and Stout also put forward
the team production theory, where directors focus instead on key contributors, which
provide valuable inputs to the firm. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team
Production Theory of Corporate Law, 85 VA. L. REV. 247, 249–55 (1999).
272
Fershee, supra note234, at 362 (attributing this increased focus partly on the rise of
social enterprise corporate forms, but also to the general decline of director primacy
towards a more intrusive interpretation of the business judgment rule by the courts in
Delaware).
273
Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Norms & Corporate Law, Introduction,
149 U. PA. L. REV. 1607, 1608 (2001).
274
Melvin A. Eisenberg, The Conception That the Corporation is a Nexus of
Contracts, and the Dual Nature of the Firm, 24 J. CORP. L. 819, 822–23 (1999). There is
some debate whether the corporation in this approach is itself the nexus of contracts or is
separate and apart from the nexus of contracts. For example, Bainbridge argues that the
corporation is a nexus of contracts. Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note45, at 553.
Hessen also argues that the corporation is not an entity, but instead a group of contracting
individuals. See Robert Hessen, A New Concept of Corporations: A Contractual and
Private Property Model, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1327, 1336 (1979).
275
Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note45, at 586; see also Jonathan R. Macey,
An Economic Analysis of the Various Rationales for Making Shareholders the Exclusive
Beneficiaries of Corporate Fiduciary Duties, 21 STETSON L. REV. 23, 41 (1991).
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shareholder value.276 The purpose of fiduciary duties and the shareholder wealth
maximization norm that guides their application, according to contractarians, is to
focus the loyalty of directors towards shareholders.277 Shareholders are reified and
elevated in this characterization of the corporation through a hypothetical bargain
analysis. Shareholder wealth maximization appears as the majoritarian default rule
or the governing principle that the majority of participants in this hypothetical
bargain would choose.278
According to many contractarians, the role of shareholder wealth
maximization is to seek long-term shareholder value or gain.279 However, Jensen
describes the ultimate goal of the corporation in terms of the firm and not
shareholder value. He states that the value maximization norm means that
corporate managers should make all decisions so as to increase the total long-run
market value of the firm.280 Allen et al. describe one possible aim of corporate law
as being to achieve the best results for stockholders, based on the property model
of the corporation that generates value for the entity in the long term. 281 Delaware
law has embraced the property model of the corporation as an entity, which still
incorporates shareholder wealth maximization, but in a form that emphasizes longterm wealth maximization by reinforcing some powers of corporate directors.282
Hansmann and Kraakman describe the primary aim of corporate law as
striving to increase long-term shareholder value.283 However, the definition of
shareholder value is often unclear.284 Shareholders represent a shifting class of

276

Thomas A. Smith, The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional
Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty, 98 MICH. L. REV. 214, 217 (2000). There are clear
critiques of this approach. See, e.g., LYNN A. STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH:
HOW PUTTING SHAREHOLDERS FIRST HARMS INVESTORS, CORPORATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC
(2012).
277
Bainbridge, In Defense, supra note45, at 1441.
278
Bainbridge, Director Primacy, supra note45, at 573.
279
Id. at 583.
280
Michael C. Jensen, Value Maximization, Stakeholder Theory and the Corporate
Objective Function, 14 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 3, 12 (2002) (defining the value of the firm
as the sum of all financial claims on firms including equity, debt, warrants and preferred
stock).
281
William T. Allen et al., The Great Takeover Debate: A Meditation on Bridging the
Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1067, 1071 (2002).
282
Id. at 1079; see also William T. Allen, Our Schizophrenic Conception of the
Business Corporation, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 261, 272–75 (1992) (noting that, historically,
theories of wealth maximization have ‗papered over‘ the conflict over the conceptual
approaches of the corporation by invoking what he calls a murky distinction between longterm profit maximization and short-term profit maximization).
283
Hansmann & Kraakman, The End of History for Corporate Law, supra note 45, at
439–41.
284
See Hemingway, supra note167, at 970–71 n.90 (noting that value can often be a
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investors, some with long term and others with short term profit profiles. It is
difficult for managers to determine the time and risk preferences of existing and
future shareholders.285 As a result, directors may seek to maximize share price, but
markets are not always efficient in terms of absorbing and assessing
information.286 As Keay notes, the strong version of the efficient market hypothesis
states that the share price will automatically take into account all public and private
information at any given time about the corporation, and the semi-strong version
takes into account all public information. 287 Therefore, while descriptions of
shareholder wealth maximization often incorporate a long-term view, its
application does not always (or even typically) clearly distinguish between
shareholder value and share price, or provide guidance to directors on whether
their focus should be on share value or overall firm value.288
Reliance solely on share price depends on the efficient market hypothesis –
that markets accurately, efficiently, and timely absorb and assess all relevant
information about the corporations.289 Stout describes this as the ―Achilles heel‖ of
the hypothesis because it is not clear how information flows into share price
valuation.290 Market prices may not closely reflect actual expected risks and

broader term than wealth maximization, with the latter often focusing solely on profit
whereas shareholder can value a number of outputs in addition to profits).
285
Henry T. C. Hu, Risk, Time, and Fiduciary Principles in Corporate Investment, 38
UCLA L. REV. 277, 287 (1990) (noting that directors must satisfy both widows and
orphans seeking sure and immediate succor as well as cowboy capitalists waiting for a
bigger score); Mark E. Van Der Weide, Against Fiduciary Duties to Corporate
Stakeholders, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 27, 37 (1996) (explaining that shareholders diverge in
their interests in several ways including long-term versus short term, diversified versus
non-diversified, and individual versus institutional); Lisa M. Fairfax, Making the
Corporation Safe for Shareholder Democracy, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 53, 83–85 (2008) (noting
several ways in which shareholder interests can diverge with specific differences of
alignment between short-term and long-term investors and their potential alignment with
stakeholders); Stephen M. Bainbridge, Response, Director Primacy and Shareholder
Disempowerment, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1735, 1745 (2006) (arguing that ―[a]ll organizations
must have some mechanism for aggregating the preferences of the organization‘s
constituencies and converting them into collective decisions,‖ and that ―[a]uthority-based
decisionmaking structures . . . tend to arise when the firm‘s constituencies face information
asymmetries and have differing interests‖).
286
See Hu, supra note285, at 357–58.
287
Andrew Keay, Getting to Grips with the Shareholder Value Theory in Corporate
Law, 39 COMM. L. WORLD REV. 358, 369–70 (2010); Id. at 375 (questioning in the social
context whether share prices are an appropriate proxy for societal values).
288
Hu, supra note285, at 295–300.
289
Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New
Finance, 28. J. CORP. L. 635, 639–40 (2003).
290
Id. at 637; see also id. at 659–60 (noting that informational efficiency is the speed
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returns. Therefore, the use of share price alone as a decisional tool may encourage
mismanagement of assets by directors in favor of short-term returns.291 Markets are
not very good at assessing and taking into account long-term systemic risk.292
Information that is complex or difficult to acquire may take a long time to be
absorbed into the share price and may never be fully absorbed.293 This is
particularly the case in the context of climate change and climate risk – businesses
are generally not accurately accounting for and incorporating the significant, short, medium-, or long-term risks of climate change to their business.294
Despite the significant levels of risk facing corporations due to climate
change, short-termism still persists with the reliance on efficient capital market
theories that blur or dismiss the distinction between short-term and long-term
interests.295 The impacts of climate change are already affecting companies in
terms of increased operational costs, disrupted production, plant shutdowns,
worker absences due to extreme events, as well as compromised assets.296 Because
the impacts of climate change are only predicted to worsen in the coming decades,

at which prices respond to information, but that this theory assumes a homo economicus
model of human behaviour—that people are rational actors with stable preferences who
promote their own welfare).
291
Id. at 657.
292
The financial crisis of 2008 illustrates these failings. See, e.g.,. Richard A. Posner,
On the Receipt of the Ronald H. Coase Medal: Uncertainty, the Economic Crisis, and the
Future of Law and Economics, 12 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 265, 278 (2010); U.N. Conference
on Trade and Development, Corporate Governance in the Wake of the Financial Crisis:
Selected International Views, 59–63, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/DIAE/ED/2010/2 (2010).
293
Stout, supra note 289 at 656.
294
Carney,
supra
note29,
at
4–5;
WORLD
ECON. FORUM &
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, HOW TO SET UP EFFECTIVE CLIMATE GOVERNANCE ON
CORPORATE BOARDS GUIDING PRINCIPLES AND QUESTIONS 10 (2019),
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Creating_effective_climate_governance_on_corpora
te_boards.pdf [https://perma.cc/AD95-CAB7] [hereinafter WEF & PwC]; Goldstein, supra
note171, at 18.
295
See Lipton & Rosenblum, supra note271, at 203. See generally Eduard Gracia,
Corporate Short-Term Thinking and the Winner Takes All Market (Oct. 28, 2003)
(unpublished manuscript), https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.445260 [https://perma.cc/ADC95UAC] (discussing the impact of corporate short-term thinking); David Millon,
Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911, 911 (2013); Daniel M.
Gallagher, Activism, Short-Termism and the SEC: Remarks at the 21 st Annual Stanford
Directors‟
College
(June
23,
2015),
available
at
https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/activism-short-termism-and-the-sec.html
[https://perma.cc/3MS6-4PT7]; Leo E. Strine Jr., One Fundamental Corporate Governance
Question We Face: Can Corporations Be Managed for the Long Term Unless Their
Powerful Electorates Also Act and Think Long Term?, 66 BUS. LAWYER 1, 10–12 (2010).
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Goldstein et al., supra note171, at 22 tbls. 1 & 2.
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companies must shift from an incrementalist adaptation approach to
transformational and long-term approaches to decision-making and disclosures on
climate risk and climate change.297 This requires long-term thinking, and the ability
to manage large time scales and complex information on climate change and to
adapt these into smaller pieces of information that can be absorbed into industry
sectors and individual corporate strategies. Directors will need guidance and
expertise to do this, and they must adopt long-term thinking.298
While the shareholder wealth maximization norm is commonly interpreted as
allowing directors to take a long-term view, systemic market forces that tend
towards short-termism still have a powerful grip over the norm‘s application.
Therefore, fiscal incentives, along with broader and deeper regulatory changes on
corporate emissions, are required for swift and effective transitions away from
fossil fuels. Despite these disincentives, fiduciary duties as currently interpreted
are sufficiently flexible to allow directors to take into account the risks of climate
change to their businesses and take a longer-term perspective on value creation that
incorporates the risks and opportunities of energy transitions. In particular,
fiduciary duties as guided by the shareholder wealth maximization norm at the
very least require directors to be informed of and take into account the risks of
climate change to their businesses. Barker notes that as climate risks have evolved
to become an issue of financial import for many corporations, assessing climate
risk is not only consistent with but is now a prerequisite to the maximization of
wealth.299 In addition, directors‘ views on maximization of wealth may be
changing. In August 2019, the Business Roundtable (a group of CEOs of
approximately 200 of the largest U.S. corporations) issued a statement on the
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Id. at 23.
The Center for American Progress (CAP) recently petitioned the SEC to create a
standard disclosure for environmental, social, and governance indicators. Letter from
Cynthia A. Williams et al., to Brent J. Fields, Secretary, SEC, Petition for a Rulemaking on
Environmental, Social, and Governance Disclosure (Oct. 1, 2018),
https://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2018/petn4-730.pdf [https://perma.cc/5LX8-4C7U].
Signatories to the petition included investors managing over US$5 trillion worth of assets,
including city and state retirement organizations, pension funds, academic institutions, and
investment firms. Id. Their petition is based on a CAP report that cites excessive shorttermism as a key obstacle preventing shareholders and other stakeholders access to the
long-term information they need to assess the long-term stability of their target investments
in the context of climate change. Id. The CAP report connects the detrimental effect of
short-term profit making in the context of the shareholder wealth maximization norm to the
issue of climate change. ANDY GREEN & ANDREW SCHWARTZ, CORPORATE LONGTERMISM, TRANSPARENCY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST (2018),
https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/economy/reports/2018/10/02/458891/corporatelong-termism-transparency-public-interest [https://perma.cc/5BC2-RAP3].
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Barker, supra note31, at 205.
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purpose of the corporation which differed significantly from all of their previous
statements issued since 1997 which had all focused primarily on shareholders. In
the 2019 statement, a commitment to all stakeholders is emphasized, as well as a
focus on generating long-term value for shareholders.300
While increasing litigation on climate change has raised the profile of climate
risks, and fiduciary duties provide sufficient flexibility to directors to assess and
consider climate risk, several barriers still remain. One such barrier is the structure
of corporate groups, as will be discussed in the next section. Shareholders of
companies enjoy limited liability, meaning that shareholders, absent certain
circumstances, are not liable for debts incurred by the corporation in which they
hold shares.301 These shareholders may themselves be corporations, called parent
corporations, and together they form a corporate group.302 Limited liability is one
of the hallmarks of corporate law, and only when courts decide to pierce the
corporate veil will limited liability not apply to parent companies.303 Climate
litigation against subsidiary companies may encounter difficulties in attempting to
fix liability on the parent companies due to the firmly entrenched system of
segregating liability into individual corporate entities within a corporate group
structure. As a result, climate policies decided by the parent company and applied
to subsidiary companies may not attract liability at the parent level.
F. Corporate Group Structures – A Barrier to Climate Liability?
One area which has received less attention in this recent spate of cases is the
role of the corporate group structure in terms of liability. In many of these cases,
the parent company has been the focus of liability. However, large corporations
often segregate jurisdictional activity into separate legal entities within a corporate
group structure to purposefully disaggregate liability away from the parent
company, even if the profits are issued via dividends up to it. 304 Firms facing
higher litigation risk often tend to have more subsidiaries.305 The separate liability
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https://opportunity.businessroundtable.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/03/BRT-Statementon-the-Purpose-of-a-Corporation-with-Signatures.pdf (last visited Mar. 28, 2020)
(explaining that previous statements, that corporations exist principally to serve their
shareholders, no longer accurately describe the ways in which the CEOs endeavor every
day to create value for all our stakeholders, whose long-term interests are inseparable).
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Bainbridge, In Defense, supra note45, at 1428.
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of corporate actors within group structures has long been established in law.306 But
liability can be overcome by courts piercing the corporate veil, imposing liability
on parent companies for debts of their subsidiaries. Common law jurisdictions
such as the United States and the United Kingdom use similar tests for piercing the
corporate veil, including: the alter ego test; the test of whether there has been
complete domination by a parent company of a subsidiary company; the test of
whether the parent has abused the privilege of incorporation; and the single
business enterprise doctrine.307
A recent case in the United Kingdom illustrates how difficult piercing the
veil can be in the carbon-major group structure. The case of HRH Emere Godwin
Bebe Okpabi308 highlights the relevance of this doctrine in the context of climate
change litigation. Here, the claimants were seeking damages as a result of serious
and ongoing pollution from leaks of oil from a pipeline in the Niger Delta from the
parent company of the Royal Dutch Shell group.309 The local subsidiary, Shell
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd (RDS), and its subsidiary,
SPDC, were also respondents. The claimants claimed negligence under the
common law of Nigeria, which is the same as the common law test in the United
Kingdom, and brought a suit in the English courts, which was appealed to the
Court of Appeal.310 The Court of Appeal considered the 3-part test of the duty of
care as foreseeability, proximity, and reasonableness, and considered that a parent
company could owe a duty of care to an employee of a subsidiary or a party
directly affected by its operations in certain circumstances: where the parent has
taken direct responsibility for devising a material health and safety policy and its

Subsidiaries, 67 Q. REV. ECON. & FIN. 255, 256 (2018).
306
See Salomon v. A. Salomon & Co. [1897] AC 22 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.);
Adams v. Cape Indus. [1990] Ch 433 (C.A.). The U.S. jurisdiction has also had a spate of
cases which demonstrate that piercing the veil within corporate groups is difficult. See, e.g.,
Walkovsky v. Carlton, 223 N.E.2d 6, 10 (N.Y. 1966); Gardemal v. Westin Hotel Co., 186
F.3d 588, 596 (5th Cir. 1999) (finding that personal jurisdiction over the defendant was
lacking due to lacking evidence of defendant‘s business dealings in Texas). But see OTR
Assocs.‘ v. IBC Servs., Inc., 801 A.2d 407, 412 (App. Div. 2002) (finding the veil pierced
when fraud is present).
307
This latter test is more prevalent in the United States. But see Walkovsky, supra
note 306, at 592–93 (applying alter ego test). In the U.K., despite vigorous attempts by
Lord Denning to establish group liability through a single economic unit theory,
subsequent cases since the 1970s have not used this approach.
308
[2018] EWCA (Civ) 191 (appeal taken from EWHC (TCC)) [hereinafter HRH
Emere].
309
Id. at [1.].
310
Id. at [3].
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adequacy is the subject of the claim, or the parent controls the operations which
give rise to the claim.311
However, issuing mandatory policies was not sufficient, in the majority‘s
opinion, to demonstrate the sufficient nexus of control by the parent over the
operations of the subsidiary.312 The policies in question were at a high level, and
none came close to establishing the sort of proximity necessary to establish a duty
of care. There was, however, a strident dissent by LJ Sales, who noted that RDS
did put in place security, motivated by the negligent management of the pipeline
by the subsidiary and the negative reputational damage this was causing the parent
company.313 He argued that, because RDS directed what steps SPDC should take,
and joint decisions had been taken, this activity was enough to establish a direct
and substantial relationship and, therefore, a pattern of distribution of expertise and
control, which was arguably capable of piercing the corporate veil and meeting the
criteria in Chandler v Cape.314 The Vice Chancellor was less sanguine, stating
bluntly that the corporate structure itself is specifically designed, and therefore
militates against, requisite proximity being met. 315 However, the U.K. Supreme
Court in 2019 accepted jurisdiction to hear the appeal of another case regarding a
claim brought by 1,800 Zambian villagers against U.K.-based Vedanta and its
Zambian subsidiary regarding waste discharges from a copper mine, specifically
on the basis that group policies can, in fact, establish a sufficient nexus of control
between parent and subsidiary. 316
These cases on liability by a parent in the group structure are relevant in the
climate change context, as most policies on climate change and emissions
reductions are produced at the parent level, and the issuing of mandatory guidance
is clearly established by this case as not providing a sufficient relationship of
proximity. While a U.K. case, the outcome in relation to mandatory policies is

311

Lungowe v. Vendanta Res. [2017] EWCA (Civ) 1528; [83] (appeal taken from EWHC
(TCC)); see also Chandler v. Cape PLC [2012] EWCA (Civ) 525 [80] (appeal taken from
EWHC (QB)) 525 (imposing liability on a parent company for responsibility for the health
and safety of the subsidiary‘s employees where the parent had employed a doctor whose
specific function was to protect the employees, thereby establishing the requisite nexus of
responsibility). In HRH Emere, the issue of proximity was problematic for the court. The
court was concerned about whether RDS was in control of the SPDC operations. Five
elements of the relationship of proximity were examined: mandatory policies, standards
and manuals on engineering design and practice, systems of supervision and oversight,
financial control over SPDC, and a high level of direction and oversight of SPDC‘s
operations were exercised by RDS. [86].
312
HRH Emere at [89.].
313
Id. at [163–64] (Sales, L.J., dissenting).
314
Id. at [at 165] (citing Chandler, supra note 311)
315
Id. at [196.].
316
Vendanta Res. v. Lungowe [2019] UKSC 20. [2] (appeal taken from EWCA (Civ)).

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3379848

THE ROAD TO PARIS

63

similar to a U.S. case on piercing the corporate veil.317 In Gardemal v. Westin
Hotel,318 a widow attempted to sue the U.S. parent company of Westin Hotels
regarding the death of her husband while they were staying at a Mexican
subsidiary of the hotel chain. The plaintiff attempted to rely on a number of
circumstances, including standard mandatory policies and practices shared within
the group structure, as well as similar trademarks.319 These were specifically held
to be insufficient in establishing the single business enterprise ground of piercing
the corporate veil.320
While many states in the United States use a totality of circumstances test,
and therefore each case is decided on its facts, the use of standard climate policies
within a corporate group on its own,321 and without significant control exercised by
the parent company, will likely not be sufficient to fix liability on the parent
company. This means that litigation in jurisdictions where parent corporations are
located may be cut short if litigation is only directed at the parent company and not
the local subsidiary where the harm is being felt. Climate litigation against carbonmajor corporations is therefore not likely to coalesce in the near future into a wave
of successful suits against parent corporations and, therefore, the impacts of
litigation may be muted if parent corporations are not subject to any awards of
damages.

IV. WHICH WAY FORWARD FOR DIRECTORS?
Climate risks for corporations are increasing dramatically. As discussed in the
previous sections, litigation is likely to only continue against carbon-major
corporations, and new scientific processes will continue to advance understanding
of these companies‘ contributions to climate impacts, thereby increasing the
chances of success of litigation efforts. Climate litigation matters in an era of
failing global governance, as it has the ability to connect different actors and

317

Tests for piercing the corporate veil are similar between U.K. and U.S.
jurisprudence. While both jurisdictions state that the tests for piercing the corporate veil
between parent and subsidiary companies are fact-specific, they often involve similar tests
of abuse of the corporate form, using the corporation as an alter ego.
318
Gardemal v. Westin Hotel Co., 186 F.3d 588 (5th Cir. 1999).
319
Id. at 593–94.
320
Id. at 594–95.
321
See Kinney Shoe Corp. v. Polan, 939 F.2d 209, 211–12 (4th Cir. 1991). Kinney
Shoe Company brought an action to recover money owing under a sublease between
Kinney and Industrial Realty Company but brought the suit against the parent company,
Polan. The court considered a totality of circumstances including primarily the
undercapitalization of the subsidiary, a lack of corporate formalities being adhered to, and
using the subsidiary as a shell with no substantial transactions flowing through it, and
granted the equitable remedy of piercing the corporate veil.
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governance scales.322 Climate change has been called a ―multi-scalar‖ problem323
due to the fact that its governance is found among multiple levels of actors at the
local, regional, national and international levels. Interactions amongst these
governance scales are often problematic, and so litigation can serve a unique
governance function, as it ―creates fluid pathways for interactions among
regulation at subnational, national, and international levels.‖324 The role of
litigation in transnational law is particularly pertinent for multinational entities
such as carbon-major corporations, which have subsidiaries and/or operations in
disparate jurisdictions. Multinational corporations are sensitive to regulatory
changes and progressive judicial decisions in various jurisdictions due to their
global footprints.
Climate change is posing tremendous risks to corporate assets globally. 325 The
impacts of climate change will put corporate assets at risk, including their
infrastructure, consumer base, supply chains, and, therefore, business models.
Directors sit in the crosshairs of these emerging impacts, information, and risks,
and they must act. This section highlights the publicity risks of increased litigation,
the links between litigation and directors‘ decision-making, as well as some
potential climate-based management strategies that could be adopted by directors
in the face of mounting climate impacts and risks.
A. Courtrooms as Key Battlegrounds
Courtrooms have become key battlegrounds in the public debate over
climate change.326 As Blumm and Wood note, courts offer a deliberative factfinding forum that can balance both scientific and political climate-related
concerns.327 Corporatizing climate litigation, therefore, has expository value. It
lays bare the previously secreted role of carbon-major corporations and relates it to
the human pain and suffering, as well as financial costs caused by climate-induced
extreme events. It also exposes the persistent refusal by the most regressive
corporations to act in a societally responsible manner. Many of these corporations
have pursued a self-fulfilling prophecy; the absence of regulation would ensure
that fossil fuels would be a good investment and that corporations would,
therefore, maximize their profits to the detriment of the world. 328 As Fromhoff,

322

PEEL & OSOFSKY, supra note38, at 53.
Id.
324
Id.
325
See supra, Section III.A.
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Heede, and Oreskes note, many carbon-major corporations ―are actively creating
the future that they claim to accept the need to avoid.‖ 329 The public narrative told
in these cases is important, and provides a public forum for ―an understanding of
social and factual issues [to be] co-produced and settled.‖330 The corollary of this
understanding is the proposition that these corporations are also well placed in
terms of their capacities in access to political power, wealth, technological
advancement, and expertise to lead the transition to clean, safer energy. 331
Having shed their previous reluctance to engage with climate science, judicial
actors now recognize the important role that new scientific disciplines play in the
arena of tort law. New scientific processes could also provide progressive judges
with the opportunity to rethink older interpretations of legal and evidentiary
thresholds around tort, burdens of proof and causation, as well as obligations under
corporate law.332 This second wave of climate litigation demonstrates an evolving
global conversation between courts, government actors, private victims,
tortfeasors, directors, and investors in the context of climate change.333 As the
negative impacts of climate change increase, the global responses are likely to
increase in a corresponding fashion.
While political will in the United States may still be lacking at the federal
level, state-based actions have gained traction.334 Federal resistance may also wane
as the impacts of climate change become more severe and apparent, more
information is forthcoming due to improved climate science and corporate
disclosures, and carbon-majors begin to spend less money opposing the science on
climate change. State and local actions can also increase the costs of operating for
carbon-majors through increased regulation and permitting processes and enhanced
incentives for clean energy. New scientific processes give climate-focused political
groups new tools to target these companies and increase public pressure. As a
result, anti-carbon-major movements may grow, implicating directors and
requiring that they respond to social media and other public campaigns.
As a public forum to highlight the importance of climate science, courts can
also act as drivers of public and private sector action on climate change, even if the
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the Energy Transition, 144 CLIMATIC CHANGE 591, 591 (2017).
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Ganguly et al., supra note21, at 2.
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Weaver & Kysar, supra note38, at 36.
334
Domonoske, supra note 166; Kirsten H. Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives
for State and Local Climate Change Initiatives 2 HARV. L. & POL‘Y REV. 119, 119–120
(2008); Kristen H. Engel & Marc L. Miller, State Governance: Leadership on Climate
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cases themselves are unsuccessful.335 As Ganguly et al. note, these cases could be
―sublime failures,‖ achieving the aims of the litigants without achieving judicial
success.336 The simple act of adjudicating climate change can help to shape the
norms and beliefs of the broader public about the importance of climate change,
and the contributory role and responsibilities of carbon-major companies.337 These
cases highlight the importance of the evolving nature of climate risk, even if no
damages or liability awards are ever made.
The public attention these cases garner should capture the attention of
responsible directors, as these litigation trends may lead to shifting social norms
and political contexts. While it is unclear what the causal relationship is between
litigation and strengthened climate governance, enhanced regulatory obligations
are certainly emerging.338 Common standards on disclosure are likely to become
global industry norms, and therefore will affect the nature of what information
directors should both consider and disclose to their shareholders.339 Disclosure
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See Marjanac et al., supra note25, at 616.
Ganguly et al., supra note21, at 25; see also Wallace supra note179, at 314 (noting
that due to weaknesses in causation links, climate litigation is unlikely to be disclosed
under Item 103 Regulation S-K as directors may determine that success in this litigation is
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Ganguly et al., supra note21, at 20.
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See EXPERT GROUP ON CLIMATE OBLIGATIONS OF ENTERPRISES, PRINCIPLES ON
CLIMATE OBLIGATIONS OF ENTERPRISES LEGAL PERSPECTIVES FOR GLOBAL CHALLENGES
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(2018),
https://climateprinciplesforenterprises.files.wordpress.com/2017/12/enterprisesprinciplesw
ebpdf.pdf [https://perma.cc/L24P-T93U] [hereinafter PRINCIPLES]. See also Legal Opinion
by Noel Hutley SC and Sebastian Hartford Davis, Climate Change and Directors‟ Duties,
Supplemental Memorandum of Opinion (Mar. 26 2019) [https://cpd.org.au/wpcontent/uploads/2019/03/Noel-Hutley-SC-and-Sebastian-Hartford-Davis-Opinion-2019and-2016_pdf.pdf] and Janis Sarra, Fiduciary Obligations in Business and Investment:
Implications of Climate Change (Apr. 2018).
339
The Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure has issued guidance to assist
investors in assessing the transition plans of the companies in which they have invested,
and potential changes in the value of underlying assets due to climate change. The Task
Force‘s first report identified barriers facing investors in relation to climate change, which
included lack of coherent and consistent reporting on climate change by corporations, as
well as weak corporate governance structures. See TASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES, PHASE I REPORT OF THE T ASK FORCE ON CLIMATE-RELATED
FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES 29–32 (2016), https://www.fsb-tcfd.org/wpcontent/uploads/2016/03/Phase_I_Report_v15.pdf [https://perma.cc/TPV8-4842]. The
work of the Task Force helped to disseminate knowledge around the bidirectional character
of corporate climate risk – encouraging directors and investors to assess potential risks of
climate change to their businesses. The final report highlighted the risks of climate change
to global fiscal stability. While the impacts of climate change are both industry-specific and
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obligations will put the issue of climate change directly on the agendas of AGMs,
becoming an increasing concern for shareholders and, therefore, directors. The
impacts of climate change are costly to corporations, and the bidirectional risk
metrics of climate change should now necessarily inform directorial duties,
significantly boosting the potential contribution of private law to resolving the
climate crisis.
B. Connecting Litigation with Directors‟ Duties
Legal obligations for corporations in the context of climate change are already
slowly transitioning towards greater liability.340 At the very least, the materiality
and risk thresholds for disclosure and fiduciary considerations for directors are
increasing. The Task Force on Climate-Related Financial Disclosure (TCFD) has
issued guidance to assist investors in assessing both the transition plans of the
companies in which they have invested and potential changes in the value of
underlying assets due to climate change.341 If investors perceive increased risks of
climate change to companies, they are likely to push for increased disclosure by
directors and continue to put pressure on directors to address these risks. Directors
may also be under pressure to disclose private governance risks from their
emissions, including reputational risks, supply chain risks, increased customer and
investor demands, and financial risks.342 Attorneys may also be at risk of ethics
rules violations if their clients fail to disclose the risks of climate change. 343
As impacts and risks materialize more clearly, litigation is likely to increase
and take even more varied forms. Already, industries such as the fishing industry
have started suing carbon-majors for harm from climate change.344 Banks and
international financial institutions are moving away from financing fossil-fuel
intensive activities and industries,345 and if financial institutions become the target

variable, the Task Force identified best practices in corporate disclosures on climate
change, including seven broad principles for effective reporting. See id. at 4.
340
See EXPERT GROUP ON CLIMATE OBLIGATIONS OF ENTERPRISES, supra note341, at
38.
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Michael P. Vandenberg & Ben Raker, Private Governance and the New Private
Advocacy, 32 NAT. RESOURCES & ENVIR. 45, 45–49 (2017).
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Change, 2020 UTAH L. REV. (forthcoming 2020).
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of litigation, carbon-majors could encounter difficulties finding financing for
future activities. Litigation imposes both direct costs on companies of settlements
and attorneys‘ fees, but also indirect costs such as investor uncertainty about firm
prospects, loss of customers, suppliers and prestige, and a diversion of
management time and resources.346 Litigation can also affect credit ratings, the cost
of debt, and other financing costs.347 Litigation ―will progress as the threat of
runaway climate change materialises‖ more clearly, and courts are likely to ―step
in and interpret the law in a way that meets society‘s most urgent demands.‖348
However, it should be noted in the U.S. context that President Trump‘s most
enduring legacy will be the appointment of conservative judges. 349 These judicial
appointments may provide a dampening effect on climate litigation trends, and any
successful district court cases may have a short shelf life.
Despite this judicial dampening potential, this Article has demonstrated that a
shift is emerging in the context of litigation launched against carbon-major
corporations, with judges engaging more closely with new climate science
processes, litigants becoming more creative, and, consequentially, raising public
consciousness of climate change. This litigation shift is putting direct pressure on
directors‘ duties by highlighting the risks of climate change to corporations and is
likely to have several impacts. It will directly affect the procedural elements of

Summit,
Press
Release
No.
2018/087/CCG
(Dec.
12,
2017),
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FOUNDATION, European Central Bank to Consider Climate Impact (Jul. 10, 2018),
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directors‘ duties by raising the profile of climate risk and the role and contribution
of carbon-major corporations to climate risk, and by triggering a legal obligation to
both consider and incorporate this information into their decision-making
processes.
Litigation may also have more indirect effects by influencing the content of
directors‘ decisions if directors take a long-term perspective. The open-textured
nature of directors‘ duties allows directors to react to evolving risks and industry
norms. Directors are supposed to be informed and responsible actors, and the
increased profile of climate change risk can no longer be ignored by directors of
corporations that are highly vulnerable to climate risks.
Whether or not tort law adapts to climate change or these cases are successful,
climate change triggers the application of fiduciary duties by the sheer scale of the
risk it poses to businesses. In many instances, climate change is leading to an
adaptation of legal orders and legal reasoning,350 and this will continue to be the
case in the area of corporate law. While corporate law was historically insulated
from environmental concerns, the risks of climate change are becoming so great
that directors can no longer afford to ignore them, or not to pass on risk-based
information to their shareholders. As a result, private law may contribute to better
and more informed climate-decision making by directors and investors on climate
change.
Short-term profit-making has traditionally been the sole focus of many
directors, and in this vein, directors may be reluctant to make long term transition
decisions if short-term costs are incurred due to a short-term approach to
shareholder wealth maximization. As a result, market forces may continue to exert
adverse pressure on directors‘ decision-making.351 But shareholder wealth
maximization does not require a short-term approach, and directors should pay
attention to climate change not just because of the increasing risks of climate
litigation, but because climate-induced risks and damages are occurring now and
are only expected to worsen over time, and so it makes good long-term sense for
their shareholders.352 Overcoming short-term thinking will be critical for directors
to take action on climate change.
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The corporate trend in climate litigation has other, perhaps more indirect,
implications for directors. While concrete legal obligations for corporations may
be in their infant stages, Flynn notes that, even if litigation suits are unsuccessful,
they can persuade corporations to shift assets to more sustainable sources, put
pressure on them to lobby legislatures to develop comprehensive climate change
legislation, and also keep the issue of climate change alive in the public
consciousness.353 Private law could ultimately lead directors to decide to divest
assets away from fossil fuels and re-allocate assets into cleaner energy sources if
they use tools available to them.
C. Climate-Based Management Tools and Strategies
While directors may feel overwhelmed by the complexity of climate change,
there are existing steps they can and should take. They should use existing tools
made available by the TCFD to assess the risks of climate change to their business,
including direct and indirect risks. Directors should acquire a more detailed
understanding of the impacts of climate change to broader society in order to
understand and assess systemic risks, indirect risks, impacts on social welfare and
consumption patterns, and the risks of non-linear impacts of climate change. They
should also assess climate-related opportunities.
Several factors impede directors from addressing climate-related risks and
opportunities. These include competing priorities such as cybersecurity, the sheer
complexity of climate change and its systemic nature, and short-term business
cycles and risk assessments.354 While information and climate models are complex,
industry guidance under the TCFD is providing more and more tools to directors
and managers to incorporate climate change more appropriately to their business
strategies. One of these tools is scenario analysis.355 This tool allows directors to
create scenarios to predict the impact of climate change on their existing and future
profitability models. Directors should adopt scenario analysis approaches and
industry-specific guidance provided by the TCFD. While there will be some
temporal dissonances between the long time scales of climate change and the
shorter profit horizons of corporations, scenario analysis provided by the TCFD
can help directors to manage this dissonance, and craft corporate strategies to
better cater for a variety of time scales which are relevant to their businesses.356
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Climate impacts should no longer be considered as only long-term risks. Climate
impacts are happening now, and directors should assess short-, medium- and longterm impacts.
Directors should also gain a better understanding of the contributions of their
businesses to climate impacts and employ scenario analysis to assess their
predicted emissions against global temperature goals. Carbon-major companies, in
particular, should assess increasing litigation and other transition risks, including
in the realm of securities and corporate law, as well as physical risks to their assets,
including potentially stranded assets. These risks should be disclosed to investors,
following TCFD guidelines.
In addition, the acquisition of knowledge cannot remain static as the
accuracy of the science of climate change and assessment of its impacts increases.
Increasing disclosure requirements also mean that directors should implement
appropriate reporting and information systems, which are kept up to date as the
science and impacts of climate change improve and increase. Failure to monitor
and disclose risks appropriately to shareholders may violate the duty of loyalty and
could also attract litigation from investors. Litigation claims are likely to arise
when fiduciary actors fail to share and disclosure relevant information and risks to
shareholders or fail to take adaptive actions based on their knowledge.357 Litigation
aside, investors are increasingly expecting boards to have fluency‖ with ―climaterelated risks and opportunities.‖358 As stated above, directors‘ duties are opentextured and as a result do not remain static. The content and requirements of these
duties will change as scientific knowledge about the risks of climate change
evolves.
Finally, directors should assess the profitability and feasibility of energy
transitions away from fossil fuels. They should look at both mitigation and
adaptation actions beyond incrementalistic action and consider transformational
actions and the opportunities and reduction of risks they hold.
Directors of all corporations should become aware of the relevance of
climate change to their businesses, and this may involve hiring experts on the
board to achieve this. As the impacts of climate change are only predicted to
worsen in the coming decades, directors must have a clearer understanding of the
specific risks from climate change to their businesses and investigate and prepare
for transformational approaches to climate risk and climate change. This requires
that directors take longer-term perspectives but also a phased approach. In order to
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do this, directors need to develop the ability to manage and understand the large
time scales and complex information on climate change. New research is
emerging, which clearly points to the business case for transition, even for carbonmajor corporations.359 Directors should now be both fully aware of the risks that
climate change poses to their business and the opportunities available to them for
cleaner alternative energy production means. Directors will need guidance and
expertise to do this, as well as long-term thinking.
Fiduciary duties provide directors with sufficient flexibility to take on the
challenge of climate change.360 However, barriers remain. While the second
climate litigation wave looks promising, corporate group structures could pose a
further barrier to success against parent companies. 361 If litigants and regulators
cannot reach the parent companies, the scope of the second wave‘s impact may be
diminished. A myopic focus on short-term profitability also poses significant
barriers to climate action. Even if this second wave of corporate climate litigation
is largely unsuccessful, increased climate risk combined with shifting industry
norms should lead responsible directors to both cater to and carefully consider the
risks climate change poses to their businesses and shareholder interests.
While climate litigation serves useful purposes as outlined above, other
regulatory changes and fiscal incentives are required, as corporate law alone
cannot tackle the enormous challenges of climate change. But increased climate
risks and impacts also increases public awareness, which is likely to spur on
regulatory action. Directors should consider these shifts and their implications for
their businesses. This Article concludes that while a variety of regulatory and fiscal
developments are needed to provide a more comprehensive approach to climate
change, existing fiduciary duties guided by shareholder wealth maximization
norms provide sufficient flexibility for directors to tackle climate change.
CONCLUSION
The world is facing a climate crisis. Global temperatures are increasing more
rapidly than even once expected and, if emissions remain unabated, we could see
global average temperatures rise by 4ºC (or higher) by the end of the century, and
we have very little time to correct course.362 Crises can and do have impacts on
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corporate law. While corporate law remains largely a default set of rules and laws
with few mandatory requirements relating to climate change, regulatory changes
are often inspired by crises.363 Social and political regimes are reacting to the
climate crisis. Regulatory and fiscal restraints on carbon are starting to emerge, and
litigation against corporations on climate change is escalating and only likely to
increase in the future. While still in their infancy, these changes and movements
could be seen as the beginning of the end of the fossil fuel economy and could
herald in a global transition towards a lower-carbon economy.
Irrespective of the outcomes of existing cases, this new spate of corporate
climate litigation serves a different and perhaps more lasting purpose – it
highlights and publicizes the risks of climate change to directors, investors, and the
public. Directors must take into account increased climate risks when making
business decisions. Existing litigation and regulatory efforts are by no means
sufficient, and larger and broader fiscal instruments and regulatory policies will be
needed to usher in a uniform and swift energy transition. At the same time, markets
and, therefore, corporations are not accurately considering the risks of climate
change, or of transitions away from fossil fuels. Directors should assess and
consider escalating climate risks to their business and should disclose these risks to
shareholders where they are material. Fiduciary duties provide them with sufficient
flexibility to take action on climate change in the interests of their shareholders.
Corporate law, along with new industry guidance and tools, provides directors with
the strategies they require to address the climate crisis. It is in the best interests of
shareholders, but also the public at large, that directors harness the power of
corporations to tackle the climate crisis head-on, before it is too late.
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